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“AVOIDING HARM OTHERWISE”: REFRAMING
WOMEN EMPLOYEES’ RESPONSES TO THE HARMS
OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Margaret E. Johnson∗
This Article concerns the concepts of employee harm and harm avoidance
within the liability framework for hostile work environment sexual harassment by
a supervisor. Whether an employer is liable for supervisor sexual harassment
depends in part on whether the employee avoids her harm or mitigates her
damages resulting from the sexual harassment. Despite the law’s interest in
employee’s harm avoidance, courts have failed to explore fully the vast array of
harms resulting from sexual harassment and the variety of ways in which an
employee avoids these multiple harms. This Article reframes the legal discussion
of an employee’s actions in response to sexual harassment from one that almost
exclusively focuses on whether the employee failed to report the sexual
harassment. To assist in the reconceptualization, this Article explores women
employees’ responses to sexual harassment: the ways in which they are harmed by
sexual harassment, beyond the act of sexual harassment itself; and the ways in
which they avoid that harm, beyond simply reporting the sexual harassment. There
are at least two benefits from this reframing. First, a more inclusive depiction of
women employees’ injuries from, and responses to, sexual harassment would far
better inform sexual harassment liability determinations. As a result, the
determinations can fulfill the legislative intent of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to encourage and reinforce employees’ efforts to “avoid harm.” Second,
through this process, there is an opportunity to reveal the existing reality that
highlights women’s partial agency but often is obscured with the dominant picture
of a sexual harassment victim as “suffering in silence.”
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines how concepts of “harm” and “avoidance of harm”
should inform the liability framework for supervisor sexual harassment in
employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 In Faragher v. City

1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000); see also Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (establishing affirmative defense for supervisor liability for
hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (establishing affirmative defense for supervisor liability for quid pro quo sexual
harassment under Title VII).
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of Boca Raton2 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,3 the Supreme Court
established that once a plaintiff proves that she was subjected to sexual
harassment by her supervisor that did not involve a tangible employment action,4
an employer will be vicariously liable unless the employer satisfies a two-part
affirmative defense.5 The employer must prove both (a) “that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior” (hereafter the “employer-focused prong”) and (b) “that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise” (hereafter
the “employee-focused prong”).6

2. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
3. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
4. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (stating that “tangible employment action” includes “discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment”); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (stating that “tangible employment
action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits”); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 144 (2004) (approving Ellerth’s definition
of tangible employment action (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761)).
5. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
6. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added); accord
Suders, 542 U.S. at 152 (“[T]he plaintiff who alleges no tangible employment action has the duty to
mitigate harm, but the defendant bears the burden to allege and prove that the plaintiff failed in that
regard.”). Many insightful articles have been written regarding the affirmative defense to employer
liability for sexual harassment. E.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The
Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 291-339 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner, Sex, Science and Social
Knowledge] (discussing disconnect between law and actual operation of sexual harassment in
workplace and recommending changes in court’s assessment, including evaluation of entire workplace
culture and award of punitive damages); Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in
Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 131-41 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner,
Women’s Stories] (discussing how affirmative defense and its interpretation by lower courts does not
properly reflect reality of how sexual harassment operates in workplace); Louis P. DiLorenzo & Laura
H. Harshbarger, Employer Liability for Supervisor Harassment After Ellerth and Faragher, 6 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 3, 13-15 (1999) (arguing that affirmative defense inappropriately emphasizes
effect of harassment as opposed to harassment itself for liability determinations); Joanna L. Grossman,
The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 4 (2003) [hereinafter Grossman, Culture of Compliance] (using social science
and other research to critique legal and extralegal discourse that trumpets policies, complaint
mechanisms, and investigations as effective deterrence and corrective mechanisms for sexual
harassment); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61
U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 720 (2000) [hereinafter Grossman, The First Bite] (explaining that affirmative
defense’s creation of employer’s “safe harbor” to liability unless employer’s own conduct is deficient
limits employees’ compensation for actionable sexual harassment); Michael C. Harper, Employer
Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 41, 80-81 (1999) (using cost-benefit analysis to analyze how affirmative defense would
resolve remaining questions about employer liability); L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable
Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 721-34 (2007) (comparing courts’
conclusions about reasonableness of victims’ reactions to sexual harassment with research on ways in
which women typically respond to such harassment); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment—Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner
and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 198 (2001) (describing affirmative defense as
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The Supreme Court stated that in proving the employer-focused prong, the
employer could show whether the employer promulgated a sexual harassment
policy with a complaint procedure.7 The Court stated that such a showing would
be relevant, though not dispositive, to satisfying the employer-focused prong.8
Regarding the employee-focused prong, the Court stated that “a demonstration
of [plaintiff’s unreasonable failure to use any employer-provided complaint
mechanism] will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the
second element of the defense.”9 As discussed throughout this Article, however,
if the employee avoided harm otherwise, the employer should not be able to
meet its burden.
Subsequent case doctrine for supervisor hostile work environment sexual
harassment has evolved to require, almost without exception, that employees
report sexual harassment promptly and appropriately through the designated
employer-mandated channels.10 If the employee fails to report her harasser
legal standard created to change victim responses to sexual harassment and prevent discrimination in
workplace and observing that standard is flawed because it is based on “a faulty descriptive account of
how people and organizations actually behave”); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum:
The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 266 (2004) (stating
that affirmative defense is flawed because it assumes that victims of sexual harassment report
harassment, that sexual harassment policies and procedures discourage sexual harassment, and that
lower courts have failed to interpret properly affirmative defense’s requirement that employers’
policies and procedures be effective in deterring sexual harassment); John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors,
and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe
Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace
Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1401, 1435-36 (2002) (explaining that lower courts have failed to
implement properly affirmative defense); Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to
Hold Employers Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on
Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 616-25 (2006) (arguing for contextualized fact-finding
regarding whether individual employee unreasonably failed to avoid harm if she decided to submit to
sexual harassment given her credible fear of retaliation that could result in career or financial harm);
David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800”
Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense
to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1298-1301 (2001) (arguing that current
affirmative defense incentivizes employers to do only enough to meet standard and not enough to
actually aid in prevention and early reporting of sexual harassment); Michael Taylor, Let’s Talk About
Sex: A Clarification of Employer Liability for Supervisor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 27 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 607, 640-55 (2001) (proposing solutions to lack of clarity in affirmative defense’s
definition of supervisor and interpretation of affirmative defense); Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual
Harassment: The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call for Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 497 (2002)
(arguing that federal courts need to require significant action by employers to show effectiveness of
sexual harassment policies). As seen in these articles, many legal scholars have already provided very
informative descriptions and critiques of the affirmative defense and its interpretation by the courts.
Accordingly, this Article seeks to build on that body of scholarship and explore a different area of the
affirmative defense. Specifically, this Article explores the full meaning and use of the affirmative
defense as it relates to sexually harassed employees’ harm and avoidance of harm.
7. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
8. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
9. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
10. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 6, at 1432 n.188 (citing Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243,
246 (2001), for “treating plaintiff’s failure to use employer’s complaint procedure as a complete bar to
recovery with no discussion of how much harm a reasonably prompt complaint would have
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appropriately, in most instances, she will be barred from holding the employer
liable for the sexual harassment to which she was subjected.11 Yet this
requirement is in tension with the reality of women workers’ lives. The vast
majority of women employees do not report sexual harassment, and if they do
report it, most do so after a period of time has elapsed or complain to persons
that may not be included in the employer’s prescribed procedures for
complaining.12
Commentators have discussed thoughtfully aspects of this tension between
the doctrine and women employees’ reality.13 Even the Supreme Court, in
creating the footprint for the lower courts’ case law, recognized the
incongruence. In crafting the affirmative defense to liability for supervisor sexual
harassment in 1998, the Supreme Court noted that a requirement that employees
show how they avoided the harm of sexual harassment by formally reporting the
sexual harassment to their employer stood in contrast to the reality that the vast
majority of women employees do not complain for various reasons.14 In
response, the Supreme Court articulated that a reporting requirement would
hopefully change women employees’ behavior in mitigating this harm.15 But
since 1998, studies show that reporting behavior has decreased, not increased, in
frequency despite the requirement.16 The Armed Forces 2002 Sexual

prevented”).
11. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *4 (4th Cir.
Nov. 15, 1999) (holding that where employee delayed in reporting hostile environment claim arising
from her rape, employer was not liable as matter of law).
12. See, e.g., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 29 (1995) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL WORKPLACE] (noting that inaction is most common reaction to sexual harassment even
though filing formal complaint is more likely to stop harassment).
13. See, e.g., Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 117 (“The legal standards the United
States Supreme Court has developed concerning sexual harassment law do not always reflect the
reality of how sexual harassment operates in the workplace.”); Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife
Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 374 (2004) (stating that “[t]here is
. . . a considerable gulf between the legal expectations of courts and the actual behavior of employees”
because vast majority of women employees do not report sexual harassment and reporting is what law,
interpreted most narrowly, requires (citing Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 8));
Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 677 (asserting that existing legal doctrine unfairly penalizes
majority of employees who fail to use formal complaint mechanisms, thereby undermining legal
system’s ability to compensate employees and pursue gender equality in workplace).
14. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
15. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (stating that limiting employer liability in order to encourage
employees to report offensive conduct before it becomes pervasive fulfills Title VII’s deterrent
rationale). But see Chamallas, supra note 13, at 377 (“Despite the incentive provided by legal reporting
requirements, these patterns are unlikely to change because the social science evidence on lack of
reporting has been so consistent and the pressures not to report are still present in the workplace.
Thus, when a court regards a victim’s failure to report as presumptively unreasonable, it is making a
negative judgment that applies to a large majority of sexual harassment victims.”).
16. RACHEL N. LIPARI & ANITA R. LANCASTER, ARMED FORCES 2002 SEXUAL HARASSMENT
SURVEY 30 (2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040227shs1.pdf [hereinafter 2002
ARMED FORCES SURVEY]; RACHEL N. LIPARI ET AL., 2004 SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY OF
RESERVE
COMPONENT
MEMBERS
15
(2005),
http://www.sapr.mil/contents/references/
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Harassment Survey showed a decrease of reporting by women.17 This survey
showed that a smaller percentage of women reported sexual harassment in 2002
than in 1995.18 The 2004 Sexual Harassment Survey of Reserve Component
Members showed that sixty-seven percent of women and seventy-eight percent
of men who were subjected to sexually harassing behavior did not report it.19
Large percentages of women decided not to report despite the fact that eightyfive to ninety percent of them reported that they had received the policies setting
out the employer’s complaint procedures.20
Yet simply because women employees often do not complain officially
about the sexual harassment to which they are subjected does not equate to a
wholesale failure by women employees to respond in any way or otherwise avoid
harm. Too often this flawed logic is articulated in case law.21 For instance, in
Jones v. District of Columbia,22 the court correctly identified that the affirmative
defense to liability in part focuses on whether the plaintiff “avoided suffering
harm by taking some action.”23 Nonetheless, despite this accurate assertion of
the rule, the court failed to actually analyze the “avoid harm otherwise”
component. Therefore, the court failed to analyze whether the plaintiff avoided
harm when, in response to a sexual advance, the plaintiff screamed, causing
another employee to intervene and stop the advances.24 The court also failed to
consider whether the plaintiff avoided harm when she told the harasser to stop.25
This decision demonstrates the pervasive gap between what employees do when
they are sexually harassed and what they are credited with doing. The gap seems
to result in part from the unreasonable expectation by the observer, or judge, of
the action as to what is a suitable response. If the expectation is that an
employee must respond to sexual harassment by filing a complaint, then all other
actions—including those attempts to stop the harassment or mitigate other
2004%20Sexual%20Harassment%20Survey%20of%20Reserve%20Component%20Members.pdf
[hereinafter 2004 ARMED FORCES SURVEY].
17. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 30.
18. Id. (reporting that thirty percent of women subjected to sexually harassing behavior reported
behavior in 2002 versus thirty-eight percent who reported in 1995).
19. 2004 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 15.
20. Id. at 110. The survey included the reasons such persons gave for not reporting the sexual
harassment. These reasons included fear of social reprisals, belief that they had taken care of the
problem themselves, concern that harassment was not important enough to report, discomfort with
reporting, view that reporting would achieve nothing, and fear of being labeled a troublemaker if they
reported. Id. at 71.
21. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. Potter, No. 04-C-4070, 2006 WL 1005127, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14,
2006) (finding that plaintiff’s failure to take advantage of complaint system was unreasonable and
therefore employer met second prong of Ellerth/Faragher defense); Jones v. District of Columbia, 346
F. Supp. 2d 25, 51 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 429 F. 3d 276 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that
plaintiff failed to prevent hostile work environment because of her failure to report behavior to
supervisor); Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (deciding that plaintiff’s
failure to complain indicated that she welcomed her supervisor’s behavior).
22. 346 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 429 F.3d 276 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
23. Jones, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
24. Id. at 33, 51.
25. Id.
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harms from being sexually harassed—become nonactions or invisible.
This gap is also evident in conclusions and findings made from workplace
studies.26 For instance, a federal workplace study often categorized employees’
responses to sexual harassment as “inaction.”27 Specifically, in its report, the
Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) stated that “the most frequently
occurring reaction to sexual harassment is inaction. The single most common
response of employees who are targets of sexually harassing behaviors . . . has
been, and continues to be, to ignore the behavior or do nothing.”28 At the same
time, however, the report catalogued a vast range of complex employee
responses to sexual harassment, including confronting the harasser, avoiding the
harasser, and threatening to tell others about the harassment.29 Such responses
stand in stark contrast to the conclusion that employees largely fail to act, as
mentioned above. Subsequent studies similarly showed that employees subjected
to sexual harassment take many actions in response to sexual harassment.30

26. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 29
(discussing how efficacy of solutions to harassment depend on one’s perspective as employee, victim,
supervisor, or official and noting that most victims respond with inaction); 2004 ARMED FORCES
SURVEY, supra note 16, at 15 (noting that most incidents of sexual harassment were not reported);
2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 30 (noting decrease in employees reporting sexually
harassing behavior from 1995 to 2002).
27. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 29.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 29-33. Specifically, the report stated that thirty-five percent of victims of sexual
harassment asked or told the harasser to stop, twenty-eight percent avoided the harasser, fifteen
percent made a joke of it, twelve percent reported it to a supervisor or other friend, ten percent
threatened to tell or told others, and seven percent went along with the behavior. Id. The report found
that forty-four percent of the victims ignored it or did nothing. Id. As discussed by several
commentators those studies that characterized responses as “doing nothing” failed to explore the
multiplicity of responses, asked open-ended questions about responses, and permitted internal
responses to be included in survey responses. Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report
Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J.
SOC. ISSUES 117, 117-38 (1995).
30. See JAMES B. GREENLEES ET AL., 2 TABULATIONS OF RESPONSES FROM THE 2002 STATUS OF
THE ARMED FORCES SURVEY – WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS 1157-1228 (Aug. 2003) (listing
responses to military sexual harassment survey detailing eighteen possible options when faced with
harassment). The data in this study includes responses to “Question 65” of the Armed Forces 2002
Sexual Harassment Survey, which asked:
To what extent did you . . .
a. Try to avoid the person(s) who bothered you?
b. Try to forget it?
c. Tell the person(s) you didn’t like what he or she was doing?
d. Stay out of the person’s or persons’ way?
e. Tell yourself it was not really important?
f. Talk to some of your family about the situation?
g. Talk to some of your coworkers about the situation?
h. Talk to some of your friends about the situation?
i. Talk to a chaplain or counselor about the situation?
j. Try to avoid being alone with the person(s)?
k. Tell the person(s) to stop?
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Perhaps highlighting the invisibility of such responses to sexual harassment is the
2002 Armed Forces Survey, which gathered data on, but then did not publish,
the broad array of actions taken in response to sexual harassment.31 Instead, the
only responses that the survey reported and analyzed were employees’ official
reports of the harassment.32 The fact that response data was not reported
underscores the premise of this Article, which is that responses other than
reporting are not being discussed in any systematic way—in workplaces, in
workplace studies, or in the law. Indeed, the label of “inaction” for any response
to sexual harassment that is not officially reporting the sexual harassment can be
seen in legal scholarship as well.33
This Article seeks to bridge this ongoing gap by bringing the reality of
employees’ harm avoidance actions into sexual harassment doctrine and
theory.34 The sexual harassment legal liability framework is charged with
crediting women employees’ actions to avoid harm, and, therefore, the
documented reality of employees’ actions taken to avoid harm needs to be
included in this analysis. This gap can only be repaired if employees, employers,
lawyers, judges, and scholars understand and recognize all of the sexual
harassment harms and avoidance mechanisms thereto that need to be accounted
for in determining liability.
Specifically, this Article focuses on women employees’ responses to sexual
harassment: the ways in which they are harmed by the sexual harassment,
beyond the act of sexual harassment itself; the ways in which they respond to
those harms, beyond simply reporting the sexual harassment; and the
effectiveness of those responses in avoiding the multiple harms of sexual
harassment. By recognizing these harm avoidance actions, this Article hopes to
reframe the discussion of employees’ actions in response to sexual harassment
from failures to report to complex amalgamations of harms and the effects of

l. Just put up with it?
m. Ask the person(s) to leave you alone?
n. Blame yourself for what happened?
o. Assume the person(s) meant well?
p. Pray about it?
q. Pretend not to notice, hoping the person(s) would leave you alone?
r. Do something else in response to the situation?
2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, app. A at 12. The results were not included in the
survey, but Rachel Lipari did provide the underlying raw data to this author.
31. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, app. A at 12.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Murr, supra note 6, at 609 (using word “inaction” to discuss instances of failure to
report sexual harassment officially).
34. See generally Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 6, at 323-38 (discussing
inconsistency between legal requirement that women complain about workplace sexual harassment
and social science research showing that women employees rarely complain); Chamallas, supra note
13, at 374 (noting that research shows that few victims follow official grievance procedures despite
expectations implied in legal doctrine); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 26-27
(recognizing various ways in which harassed employees seek to avoid harm and observing that these
employees rarely make formal reports of harassment).
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employees’ responses thereto in mitigating or otherwise avoiding the damages
from their supervisors’ sexual harassment.35
As stated above, women employees36 who are sexually harassed experience
a wide range of harms and employ a wide range of strategies to avoid the harm.
The multiple forms of harms resulting from sexual harassment include the sexual
harassment itself; the stigma of discrimination; the resulting tangible job harm,
such as a termination or nonpromotion; the resulting intangible job harm, such
as an abusive work environment and loss of employment advancement;
economic harm; and emotional, psychological and physical harm.37 In response
35. As many commentators have noted, the focus on female employees’ failure to complain
about sexual harassment echoes the much-critiqued focus on females’ failure to leave their abusers
when subjected to domestic violence. See Chamallas, supra note 13, at 375 (contending that asking
sexual harassment or domestic violence victim why she did not complain or leave is in fact insinuating
that abuse or harassment either did not occur or was not serious); Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power
and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1286
(1992) (noting that Anita Hill’s failure to leave her job with Clarence Thomas was raised to dispute
truthfulness of her sexual harassment claims, just as battered women’s mere presence in abusive
relationship raises questions about their claims).
36. Throughout this Article, I will refer to the sexually harassed employee as female. This
decision is based in part on the statistical information showing that women are more frequently
sexually harassed in the workplace than men. About fifty percent of women will experience sexual
harassment during their working lives as opposed to only between fourteen to seventeen percent of
men. Deborah Erdos Knapp et al., Determinants of Target Responses to Sexual Harassment: A
Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 687, 687 (1997) (citing, inter alia, BARBARA A.
GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON
WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 46-47 (1985); U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 11 (1988)) [hereinafter AN UPDATE]);
U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM?
36 (1981) [hereinafter IS IT A PROBLEM?]; Louise F. Fitzgerald & Sandra L. Shullman, Sexual
Harassment: A Research Analysis and Agenda for the 1990s, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 5, 7 (1993);
Donald B. Mazer & Elizabeth F. Percival, Students’ Experiences of Sexual Harassment at a Small
University, 20 SEX ROLES 1, 1-22 (1989)). In addition, the Armed Forces 2002 Sexual Harassment
Survey found that more women than men reported experiencing sexual harassment (twenty-four
percent of women versus three percent of men). 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at iv.
Specifically, forty-five percent of women and twenty-three percent of men who reported experiencing
sexual harassment reported experiencing “Crude/Offensive Behavior,” twenty-seven percent of
women and five percent of men reported being subjected to “Unwanted Sexual Attention,” eight
percent of women and one percent of men experienced “Sexual Coercion,” and three percent of
women and one percent of men reported experiencing “Sexual Assault.” Id. at iii-iv.
The decision to discuss women employees in this Article is also based on the fact that women
work at the interstices of various power hierarchies, such as those inherent in supervisor-subordinate
and male-female relationships that affect the operation of power in the workplace. Kathryn Abrams,
Subordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
111, 113 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); see also Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (recognizing that supervisor’s power invests his harassing conduct of
subordinate employee with particularly threatening character).
37. See infra notes Part III.A.1-2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various harms
sexual harassment causes. This Article, as with many other articles discussing sexual harassment, relies
on social science research in discussing the real experiences of women employees who are subjected to
sexual harassment. E.g., Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 131-41 (considering promptness
requirement for employee reporting under Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense in light of social
and medical science research explaining reluctance of female employees to report harassment);
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to these harms, women who are sexually harassed utilize a wide range of
strategies to avoid these harms, such as avoiding the harasser, objecting to the
harasser, formally complaining about the sexual harassment, seeking support
from friends and family, ignoring thoughts about the sexual harassment, and
denying that the harassment occurred.38
To date, most courts and scholars have not recognized the meaning and
potential power of the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative
defense.39 In part, this results from the broader discourse’s narrow construction
of the concepts of “harm” and “avoid[ing] harm” when discussing the affirmative
defense to liability.40 In general, judges, lawyers, and academics have discussed
“harm” as solely synonymous with the act of sexual harassment itself, such as
sexual touching or advances.41 They have discussed “avoiding harm” as only an
employee’s complaint to the employer about sexual harassment.42 As a result,
Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 723-29 (describing social science research regarding victims’
responses to sexual harassment as informing need for additional employer actions, such as sexual
harassment training); see also, e.g., Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 n.24 (9th Cir.
2003) (“[I]n some cases, a victim’s particular circumstances may render the failure to seek relief
through the employer’s available procedures objectively reasonable.” (citing Fitzgerald et al., supra
note 29, at 121)).
38. See, e.g., 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, app. A at 12 (listing these and
additional actions women took in response to sexual harassment).
39. E.g., Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL
1012803, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (omitting “avoid harm otherwise” component from
employee-focused prong); THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING
SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 172-73 (2005) (recommending that
“avoid harm otherwise” language should be eliminated because it is so vague); Harper, supra note 6,
at 80-81 (limiting “avoiding harm otherwise” to avoiding harassment only as opposed to other harms);
Taylor, supra note 6, at 655 (limiting applicability of “avoid harm otherwise” component to small
employers or employees who invite harassment (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-08)).
40. But see Chamallas, supra note 13, at 314 (“I urge recognition of the interrelationship between
economic harms on the one hand and psychological harms on the other. Because one type of harm
frequently coexists with the other, or tends to produce the other, I believe it is futile and unwise for
courts to try to draw sharp lines between economic and other losses. Instead, each should be treated as
a legitimate, job-related injury worthy of compensation.” (citation omitted)); Murr, supra note 6, at
608-09 (proposing standard that takes into account victim’s individual circumstances in determining
whether victim reasonably attempted to avoid harm when she did not utilize employer’s official
channels to report harassment).
41. See, e.g., DiLorenzo & Harshbarger, supra note 6, at 13-15 (discussing fact that affirmative
defense inappropriately focuses on harm sustained by plaintiff not for damages purposes but for
liability determinations); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 6 (describing sexual
harassment as sexual remarks, sexual teasing, sexual touching, and demands or pressure for sexual
favors); Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 708 (stating that within context of affirmative
defense to liability, as opposed to damages, harm referred to means legal harm established by
actionable hostile environment, not subjective harm felt by employee subjected to any unwelcome
sexual touching, gesture, or comment regardless of its severity or pervasiveness); Marks, supra note 6,
at 1425, 1430-37 (critiquing lower courts’ conversion of harm-avoidance doctrine to contributory
negligence doctrine, but equating harm to sexual harassment and harm-avoidance to formal
complaints). But see Murr, supra note 6, at 614-15 (providing slightly expanded, but generalized, view
of harm to include submitting to sexual harassment, job detriment resulting from failure to submit, and
emotional harm resulting from sexual harassment).
42. Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at 708 (stating that only harm plaintiff could avoid
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the discourse by courts, lawyers, and scholars often focuses only on what a
woman employee did not do, namely failing to file a formal complaint of sexual
harassment pursuant to the company’s policy.43 The employee is perceived as
having not responded; the many actions actually taken by the employee to avoid
harm are rendered hidden and insignificant.44
Instead, the concepts of “harm” and “avoid[ing] harm” should reflect and
account for the actual experiences and actions taken by women employees
subjected to supervisor sexual harassment.45 The resuscitation of the full
meaning of harm and avoidance of harm within women employees’ lives
provides the opportunity to correct for the to-date unrealistic discussion in legal
discourse and in the workplace about sexual harassment.46 A more inclusive
depiction of women employees’ injuries from, and responses to, sexual
harassment would far better inform liability determinations based on their
efforts to “avoid harm.” Through this process, there is an opportunity to reveal
the existing reality that highlights women’s agency47 but often is obscured with
the dominant picture of a sexual harassment victim as “suffering in silence.”48 As
such, women’s agency, women’s choices, acts of resistance, self-direction, and
self-definition,49 within the broader context of systemic oppression through

entirely is one where “hostile environment develops gradually” because then “the plaintiff might have
the opportunity to complain before any legally recognizable harm is done”); Marks, supra note 6, at
1445-47 (equating employee’s harm-avoidance burden with duty to use formal channels of complaint);
Murr, supra note 6, at 614 (identifying harm avoidance as either submitting to sexual harassment or
reporting sexual harassment).
43. See, e.g., Oleyar v. County of Durham, 336 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519-20 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (finding
that employer satisfied second prong of affirmative defense because plaintiff “never filed a formal
grievance alleging discrimination”); Dennis v. Nevada, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (D. Nev. 2003)
(granting summary judgment based on plaintiff’s “complete failure to formally report the alleged
harassment”); Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 139 (discussing courts’ focus on women’s
failure to avail themselves promptly of employers’ official complaint procedures when harassed);
Lawton, supra note 6, at 255-60 (noting courts’ emphasis on harassment victims’ failure to utilize
employers’ formal reporting channels).
44. See Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 139 (stating that women’s active response of
avoiding harasser and harassment are instead seen as “‘doing nothing’ by the courts”).
45. Beiner has also discussed the courts’ failure to reflect the reality of sexual harassment and its
operation in the workplace in considering other aspects of the affirmative defense. Id. at 117.
46. Id. at 117-18.
47. See Abrams, supra note 36, at 112-13 (defining agency as “the capacity for self-definition or
self-direction, a capacity that has often been comprehended within the term ‘autonomy’ in classical
liberal analysis”).
48. See Abrams, supra note 36, at 120 (listing strategies employed by harassed employees “to
protect themselves and their jobs”); Chamallas, supra note 13, at 375 (underscoring parallel arguments
between questioning judgment of women who do not leave abusive intimate relationship and women
employees who do not report sexual harassment at work); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Who Says? Legal and
Psychological Constructions of Women’s Resistance to Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 36, at 94, 99-101 (observing that women resist unwelcome sexual
harassment in many ways even if “[t]he response the law apparently finds most compelling is the one
that woman [sic] make least often”).
49. Abrams, supra note 36, at 113-14.
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sexual harassment, come into sharper focus.50
Part I of this Article discusses the development of the affirmative defense to
employer liability for supervisor sexual harassment. Part II of this Article relates
a brief fictional story about Lena, a female employee, who is a composite of
many real women employees. Lena alleges that her supervisor, Dave, has
sexually harassed her. This story contextualizes this Article’s discussion of the
affirmative defense to supervisor sexual harassment. Part III explores the
concepts of “harm” and “avoidance of harm” within the liability framework for
supervisor sexual harassment under Title VII law and social science research.
Part IV discusses the current doctrine regarding employer liability and its
relation to employee harm avoidance. Part V argues that, based on Title VII’s
animating principle of harm avoidance as well as the realities of harm avoidance
actions taken by women employees, courts, lawyers, employees, employers, and
scholars need to reconceptualize the import and power of the “avoid harm
otherwise” component of the affirmative defense.
I.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT

In 1998, the Supreme Court articulated a specific liability scheme for sexual
harassment committed by a supervisor (hereinafter described as “supervisor
sexual harassment”). This articulation provided guiding principles for such
liability determinations and created an affirmative defense based on those
principles. The Court articulated this framework in two companion cases,
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth51 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.52
Specifically, the proof framework required that once a court determined that a
supervisor sexually harassed an employee, the next inquiry was whether liability
for the sexual harassment could be imputed to the employer.53 The Court
determined that employers were to be held vicariously liable for supervisor
sexual harassment.54 If the supervisor sexual harassment resulted in a tangible
employment action,55 such as a firing or a demotion, the employer would be

50. Id. at 114; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (recognizing that
supervisor draws on his superior position, making it difficult for subordinate employee to deal with
harassment); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (acknowledging power
differential and antisubordination theory when supervisor sexually harasses subordinate); Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1748-55 (1998) (discussing sexual
harassment as part of larger problem that workplace is systematically gender biased and produces
disadvantages for women).
51. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
52. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
53. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
54. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; accord Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1998)
(stating that employer is presumed to be absolutely liable for supervisory sexual harassment, as
opposed to coworker harassment, for which employer will only be liable for negligence); McPherson v.
City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When a supervisor is the harasser, the employer
is strictly liable for his or her conduct, subject to any affirmative defenses that may preclude its
liability.”).
55. See supra note 4 for Faragher and Ellerth’s definition of a tangible employment action.
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automatically liable without any affirmative defense to such liability.56 On the
other hand, if the sexual harassment created a hostile work environment without
any tangible employment action, the employer would be vicariously liable
subject to a two-part affirmative defense.57 Under the defense, to be free of
liability, the employer has to prove successfully both parts of the test.58 Under
the first part, the employer must prove “that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior”
(hereinafter described as the “employer-focused prong”).59 Under the second
part, the employer must prove “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise” (hereinafter described as the “employeefocused prong”).60
In crafting the entire affirmative defense, the Supreme Court relied on a
number of principles, including harm avoidance, common law agency,
respondeat superior, conciliation, and notice.61 Below, this section focuses on the
harm avoidance doctrine because it is the specific principle that the Court
articulated as the basis for the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the
employee-focused prong.
The Court relied on the avoidable consequences doctrine in creating the
affirmative defense in general and the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the
employee-focused prong of the affirmative defense in particular.62 The avoidable
consequences doctrine focuses on the mitigation of injuries and damages.63 One

56. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
57. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
58. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
59. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
60. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
61. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (developing affirmative defense based on other principles because
“aided in the agency relation[ship]” standard had not developed enough to help clarify further
whether automatic liability should attach in supervisor hostile environment sexual harassment cases).
Please note that this Article does not discuss the common law agency and respondeat superior
principles at length because, in the end, the Court crafted the “avoid harm otherwise” requirement
based on harm avoidance principles.
62. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07. The court in Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
stated that:
The “failure to avail” standard is not intended to punish the plaintiff merely for being
dilatory. Rather, it “reflects an . . . obvious policy imported from the general theory of
damages,” namely, that the victim has a duty to mitigate her damages. “If the victim could
have avoided harm, no liability should be found against the employer who had taken
reasonable care, and . . . no award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for
what her own efforts could have avoided.”
Greene, 164 F.3d at 674 (first omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at
807); see also Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that second prong
incorporates avoidable consequences doctrine); Murr, supra note 6, at 609-12 (discussing Supreme
Court’s reliance on avoidable consequences doctrine in crafting employee-focused prong).
63. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (basing its holding on “the principle of vicarious liability for
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII’s equally basic policies of
encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees”); Ellerth, 524 U.S.
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of Title VII’s primary objectives, according to the Court, is to prevent harm.64
Accordingly, the harm avoidance rationale is a basis for both the employer- and
employee-focused prongs of the affirmative defense. Specifically, the Court
found that the employer-focused prong, which requires the employer to
“exercise[] reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior,”65 explicitly underscored the employer’s obligation to
prevent violations of the statute, identified as acts of sexual harassment, and
correct the behavior if violations occur.66 The Court indicated that reasonable
prevention would include an employer having an antiharassment policy and
effective, reasonable procedures by which an employee subjected to sexual
harassment could report and resolve the behavior.67 Reasonable corrective
efforts would include an employer taking prompt remedial action to deal with
the sexual harassment.68
The Court also stated that the employee-prong of the affirmative defense to
liability and damages for supervisor sexual harassment was consistent with the
policy rationale of harm avoidance by the employee.69 The defense only credits
an employer who takes reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment
in the workplace if the employee did not fulfill her equally important
“coordinate duty” to avoid or mitigate harm.70 As one commentator stated, “the
Court’s simple pronouncements in [Faragher and Ellerth] require that employers
be held liable . . . for harm that the victimized employee could not have avoided
through reasonable care.”71 Accordingly, in establishing the affirmative defense,
the Court stated that the employer should be permitted to show an affirmative
defense to automatic liability that both showed that it “had exercised reasonable
care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur, and that the
complaining employee had failed to act with like reasonable care to take
advantage of the employer’s safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm that
at 764 (declaring that Court is bound by precedent that seeks to promote Congress’s goal of
“conciliation rather than litigation” in Title VII disputes); Marks, supra note 6, at 1439-40 (“[T]he
Court sought “to accommodate” a comprehensive range of competing principles and policies:
specifically, the panoply of agency principles counseling in favor of vicarious liability when supervisors
abuse their power, versus policies of prevention and mitigation furthered by limiting liability when
employers exercise forethought and employees fail to pursue reasonable harm-avoidance strategies.”).
64. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
65. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
66. Id. at 806 (stating that statutory policy provides incentives to prevent sexual harassment
through establishment of complaint procedures).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 807 (stating that necessary element of affirmative defense is “that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior”); cf.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (noting Title VII is designed to promote effective grievance mechanisms).
69. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
70. Id. at 806; Marks, supra note 6, at 1419-20 & n.11 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806); see also
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (stating that defense is only applicable where employee failed in obligation to
avoid harm); cf. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 128 (1935) (“[I]t
seems more realistic to recognize that denial of recovery for avoidable injury is really a doctrine
restricting the limits of liability for the reasons of social and economic policy . . . .”).
71. Marks, supra note 6, at 1435.
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could have been avoided.”72 As such, the entire defense focuses on not only the
employer’s duties to prevent and correct sexual harassment but on an
employee’s duty (to be proven by the employer) to avoid harm.73
Regarding the employee-focused prong, the Court provided two ways in
which the employee might meet her duty: either she can avail herself of the
employer’s preventive or corrective opportunities, or she can avoid harm
otherwise.74 In Faragher, the Court identified that a sexual harassment “victim
has a duty ‘to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid
or minimize the damages’ that result from violations of the statute.”75 This
policy, the Court stated, was “imported from the general theory of damages.”76
The Court grounded the employee-focused prong in tort law’s “avoidable
consequences” doctrine, which governs mitigation of damages by plaintiffs after
the harm has occurred.77 This doctrine is distinct from the doctrine of
“contributory negligence,” which is a liability concept that discusses a plaintiff’s
duty to take measures to stop the harm before it occurs.78
By justifying the affirmative defense’s focus on the employee’s duty to avoid
harm as relating to the avoidable consequence doctrine, as opposed to the
contributory negligence doctrine, the Court dictates that employers focus on
actions taken by employees after experiencing harm when invoking the
affirmative defense to liability determinations in supervisor sexual harassment
cases.79 If an employee’s “damages could reasonably have been mitigated[,] no
72. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805. In addition, the Court stated that “a theory of vicarious liability for
misuse of supervisory power would be at odds with the statutory policy if it failed to provide
employers with some such incentive.” Id. at 806.
73. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146 (2004) (reiterating that, in proving
affirmative defense to liability, defendant bears burden of proving that plaintiff could have reduced
her loss or avoided harmful consequences). The Court clarified that a plaintiff may, but is not required
to, make factual allegations showing her acts to avoid or mitigate harm in anticipation of the
employer’s affirmative defense. Id. at 152.
74. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 (“If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the
employer’s preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages that could have been
avoided if she had done so. If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be found against
the employer who had taken reasonable care, and if damages could reasonably have been mitigated no
award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have
avoided.”).
75. Id. at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982)); accord Holly D.
v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1178 (9th Cir. 2003) (confirming that employee-focused prong of
employer’s affirmative defense addresses victim’s duty to avoid or minimize her damages).
76. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
77. Id. (stating general damages theory that victim must use reasonable means to avoid or
minimize damages); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (“Title VII borrows
from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine . . . and the considerations which animate that
doctrine would also support the limitation of employer liability in certain circumstances.”); Murr,
supra note 6, at 535 (stating that second prong of affirmative defense is based on avoidable
consequences doctrine and associated with mitigation of damages).
78. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 128-29 (contrasting doctrine of avoidable consequences with
doctrine of contributory negligence and stating that where plaintiff is negligent prior to completion of
defendant’s wrongdoing, under doctrine of contributory negligence, plaintiff is barred from any relief).
79. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (citing Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231 n.15; see also Holly D., 339
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award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own
efforts could have avoided.”80 As stated by one commentator:
Under [the avoidable consequences] doctrine, the employer’s task is
one of causal apportionment. To fully avoid liability, the employer
must prove that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avoid all harm;
otherwise, the doctrine of avoidable consequences allows imposition of
liability, subject only to “mitigation” of damages that the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to avoid.81
If the employee “could have avoided suffering harm by taking some action that a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would likely take,” and if she does
not take that action, then the employer should not be liable.82 Another
commentator underscored the importance of analyzing the reasonableness of the
harm avoidance actions taken in determining liability.83 For instance, if the
plaintiff submitted to the sexual harassment rather than reporting it because she
reasonably calculated that she would lessen her job-related harm of possible
retaliation and economic harm of lost wages if fired, then the plaintiff’s harm
avoidance actions should be evaluated under a reasonableness standard.84
In crafting the affirmative defense, the Supreme Court rejected Justice
Thomas’s concerns raised in his dissenting opinion in Ellerth, that “‘employers
will be liable notwithstanding the affirmative defense, even though they acted
reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of reasonable

F.3d at 1178 (observing that second prong is based on damages theory that victim has duty to avoid or
mitigate damages through reasonable means (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806)).
It should be noted that the Court is frequently, but not always, consistent in its recitation of the
avoidable consequences doctrine. In Faragher, the Court at one point seemingly confuses the
avoidable consequences doctrine with the contributory negligence doctrine. 524 U.S. at 807.
Specifically, the Court stated that if the employee unreasonably failed to avoid the sexual harassment,
liability is barred against the employer. Id. Although the Court made this statement within its broader
discussion of the avoidable consequences doctrine, this reasoning seems grounded in contributory
negligence doctrine. As one commentator noted, contributory negligence is “a largely rejected defense
from antiquated tort law.” Marks, supra note 6, at 1445. This rejection of the defense occurred because
“[t]he defense ‘departed seriously from ideals of accountability and deterrence because it completely
relieved the defendant from liability even if he was by far the most negligent actor.’” Id. at 1445 n.248
(quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 494 (2000)). Accordingly, the contributory negligence
defense has been rejected and “largely replaced with various systems of ‘comparative fault’ that
generally attempt to apportion accountability based on the relative fault of the parties.” Id. In light of
the disfavor of contributory negligence and the fact that the Court only made one isolated reference to
the doctrine, it cannot be given much significance here. Rather, because the Court discussed at length
the avoidable consequences doctrine, it appears to be the animating principle of the “avoid harm
otherwise” component.
80. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
81. Marks, supra note 6, at 1420 (footnote omitted).
82. Jones v. District of Columbia, 346 F. Supp. 2d 25, 50 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
429 F.3d 276 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
83. See Murr, supra note 6, at 613-15 (recognizing that economic and job-related harms can result
from sexual harassment and that calculation of avoiding harm by either submitting to sexual
harassment or reporting sexual harassment has to be evaluated based on which action more
reasonably would be effective at avoiding harm).
84. Id. at 614-15.
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care to avoid harm.’”85 Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (“EEOC”) Enforcement Guidance illustrates the harm-avoidance
rationale by stating that the employer will not successfully establish the
affirmative defense if the employee made efforts other than utilizing the
complaint process in order to avoid harm.86 Some examples provided by the
EEOC include “a prompt complaint by the employee to the EEOC or state fair
employment practices agency while the harassment is ongoing”87 or “a staffing
firm worker who is harassed at the client’s workplace might report the
harassment either to the staffing firm or to the client, reasonably expecting that
either would act to correct the problem.”88 Of course, the EEOC Guidance does
not purport to provide exhaustive examples of harm avoidance actions by
employees or to address directly many of the harms and avoidance mechanisms
this Article seeks to identify.89 Nonetheless, the EEOC Guidance is helpful in
illustrating that harm avoidance mechanisms other than filing a grievance with
the employer should be recognized in liability determinations under the
affirmative defense.
One scholar provides the following helpful analogy from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in order to explain the avoidable consequences doctrine and
what types of harm and harm avoidance mechanisms are included in the analysis:
In the first scenario, a tort victim suffers bodily injury but then fails to
protect her own interests by stubbornly refusing to promptly seek
treatment for those injuries. Under such circumstances, the victim may
recover only for the harm proximately caused by the tortfeasor and not
the aggravation of the initial injuries attributable to her stubborn and
thus unreasonable failure to obtain prompt medical treatment. . . . Her
choice to pursue the second alternative [delaying medical treatment] is
unreasonable in the absence of any explanation other than sheer
stubbornness.
In a second scenario . . . the same tort victim suffers the same bodily
injury but is faced with additional risks relevant to her decision-making
process. Although the victim in this second scenario realizes that her
injury likely requires prompt expert treatment, seeking such treatment
would require traveling ten miles over treacherous ice-covered roads.
Due to the hazards of travel, the victim waits until the following day to
go to the nearest physician. Because of the delay, the victim suffers
further injury. Under circumstances such as these where the victim is
choosing between two potentially costly or harmful alternatives, harmavoidance principles dictate that a trier of fact may reasonably

85. Marks, supra note 6, at 1440 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 773
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER
LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS § V.D.2 (1999), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment/html#vd. [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE].
87. Id. (citing Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999)).
88. Id. (explaining that both staffing firm and client may be responsible for taking corrective
action).
89. See id. (beginning its list of illustrations with “[f]or example”).
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conclude that the victim did not act unreasonably in delaying
professional treatment. If the trier of fact so concludes, the victim can
recover for the additional damages caused by the delay in seeking
treatment. What makes this second scenario different from the first are
the circumstances facing the victim—two competing alternatives each
with a corresponding potential harm—when she is deciding upon the
appropriate course of action. The potentially different outcome in the
second scenario is driven by a cost-benefit analysis of the two
competing alternatives.90
In the second example provided above, the victim’s harms include her
original bodily injury, the exacerbation of her original bodily injury due to her
delayed treatment, and the potential additional harm from a car accident due to
the icy conditions. The harm avoidance mechanisms in the second example
include expert treatment for the bodily injury, which would mitigate the original
injury and avoid the harm of exacerbation to that injury, and not driving on the
treacherous ice-covered roads. Accordingly, here the harm avoidance analysis is
a cost-benefit analysis of the multiple harms which would be avoided or
exacerbated by the potential harm avoidance actions. As seen in this example,
seeking expert treatment can reduce or eliminate the bodily injuries but may
create a new injury. Therefore, whether this action must or should be taken for
harm avoidance requires a balancing of the harms and how those harms might be
impacted by the actions. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, harm
avoidance analyses require an understanding that certain actions may not only
decrease specific harms but can also increase other harms.91 As a result, a
determination of whether an individual avoided harm needs to consider the costbenefit analysis involved in the individual’s decision making as to her course of
action to avoid harm.92 To make this determination, the fact finder must consider
all harms, all harm avoidance mechanisms, and all of the varying and multiple
effects on harms that will result or do result from the harm avoidance actions. It
is this complex analysis that has been missing and that needs to be introduced
into the liability determinations.
Accordingly, applying the avoidable consequences doctrine to sexual
harassment cases, a court must consider the employee’s broad range of harms
resulting from the sexual harassment and the employee’s attempts and successes
at avoiding the harm. In determining whether an employee avoided harm
otherwise, a court must consider the cost and benefit of each harm-avoidance
action available to the employee with regard to its impact on all harms from
sexual harassment. In order to provide context to the harm avoidance analysis,
the next section provides a brief discussion of a woman employee’s experience
with sexual harassment, the harms to which she is subjected, and the harm
avoidance actions she takes.

90. Murr, supra note 6, at 613-14 (footnotes omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 918 cmt. a, illus. 1, 10 (1979)).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c.
92. Murr, supra note 6, at 613-14.
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LENA’S STORY

Lena is a computer specialist at a company where she has worked for about
five years. Lena is twenty-four years old. Lena started working at the company as
an administrative assistant. At the same time, she enrolled in classes to learn
about computer software and systems. Once completing several classes, she
applied, and was selected, for the position of computer specialist about eighteen
months ago. Lena is a bit of a loner at work; she is very intelligent, energetic,
slightly high strung, incredibly hardworking, and insistent on doing an excellent
job. Lena and her husband have two young children. After the birth of each of
her children, Lena returned to work after only two weeks time because of her
love for her job and the sense of competence and satisfaction that she derived
from work. She often volunteers for and works overtime and weekends. Lena is
known by the other company employees as the person who will do whatever it
takes to get the job done.
Since Lena began as a computer specialist, Dave, the head of the computer
services department, has served as her direct supervisor. Over the past year,
Dave regularly has called Lena to his office for one-on-one meetings in which he
closes the door, sits close to her, and touches her. Initially, he brushed his hands
slightly against her thigh, but over the past few months or so, he has begun
rubbing his hand over her thigh, arm, and back.
Lena has begun making excuses to Dave for why they should meet in her
open cubicle rather than in his closed office. When Dave has touched Lena
inappropriately, she has always responded by moving her body away from him—
or standing up to end the meeting with excuses of needing to attend to other
necessary work. She also instant-messaged Victor, another computer specialist
who serves as the acting director of the department when Dave is on leave, about
Dave’s behavior. Victor has been kind to Lena since she joined the company. In
her instant message, Lena tried hard to minimize her alarm at Dave’s actions.
Victor responded with a joke about Dave’s desperation for finding a date. Lena
felt humiliated and decided to not provide any more information to Victor.
Recently, Lena has started talking to her best friend, Karen, about Dave’s
actions. Lena asked Karen whether it is possible that Lena is mistaking Dave’s
actions and whether he could be a touchy person or unaware of what he is doing.
Lena has also started to tell Karen that the joy she used to feel when going to
work is no longer there. Instead Lena feels a lot of dread. She no longer
volunteers for, and instead turns down, overtime work opportunities. She has
started calling in sick—something she never did in the past unless she absolutely
had no other choice. She also has started to have difficulty sleeping at night and
has no interest in eating. She has noticed that she feels even more on edge than
she ever had in the past.
As time passes, Lena is upset with the emotional toll and the toll on her
work caused by the turmoil at work. She talks to Karen, who says that it sounds
like Dave is sexually harassing Lena. Karen asks Lena whether the company has
a sexual harassment policy and Lena says it does. Lena investigates the policy
and learns she can complain to the director of human resources, her supervisor,
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and her supervisor’s supervisor. Lena does not want to complain to an official at
the company. For one thing, she worries that Karen is wrong and Dave’s conduct
is not sexual harassment. After all, Victor did not seem alarmed by it. Also, Lena
is worried that her coworkers will not back her up and will make fun of her, as
Victor had. And, she is concerned about how she will be able to do her job after
Dave and the others learn that she complained about him. She fears they might
not ever speak to her again. Lena does not think that the risk of losing her job is
worth reporting the behavior.
III. EMPLOYEES’ HARMS FROM SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THEIR HARM
AVOIDANCE MECHANISMS
Using Lena’s story, this Part will explore all of the harms suffered by
employees who experience sexual harassment and all harm avoidance actions
employees take in order to analyze and make liability determinations. If Lena
did bring suit, the court most likely would ask the parties to address the question
of employer liability early on in the litigation. As stated above, the affirmative
defense requires the employer to prove both (a) “that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior” and (b) “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”93
In determining liability and addressing the employee-focused prong, this
Article argues that the employer should need to identify Lena’s harms from the
sexual harassment, Lena’s responses to the various harms, and whether and how
those responses might have assisted in her avoidance of harm or mitigation of
damages. All of these factors should be relevant to a determination of whether
Lena avoided harm as required under the affirmative defense to sexual
harassment liability.
A.

Harms from Sexual Harassment

Despite its underutilization, the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the
affirmative defense is well suited to unifying the rationales of Title VII and the
affirmative defense with the reality of women employees’ experiences with
sexual harassment. The job-related, economic, and psychological harms are
intertwined injuries resulting from sexual harassment and should be analyzed as
such in liability determinations.94 Many sources, including the law, workplace
studies, and social science studies, identify the multiple harms resulting from
sexual harassment.95 Harm is more complex and varied than one discrete act of

93. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (emphasis added); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (emphasis added).
94. See Chamallas, supra note 13, at 384-85 (discussing reality that women employees suffer
economic and psychological harms as job-related injuries resulting from sexual harassment).
95. See Part III.A.1 for a discussion of sexual harassment harms identified in the law and Part
III.A.2 for a discussion of sexual harassment harms identified in workplace and social science studies.
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discrimination—such as a termination based on one’s sex. Rather, harm includes
all of the multiple injuries that result from the discrimination in addition to the
discrimination itself.
1.

Legal Support for Identifying a Broad Range of Harms

Under Title VII, harm has had a distinct meaning that is more extensive
than the discriminatory act. For instance, Title VII, as originally enacted, makes
illegal and remedies harm that results from the discrimination (for instance,
being sexually harassed); tangible employment harm, such as being fired, not
hired, and demoted; and intangible employment-related harm, such as the
altering of an employee’s terms and conditions of employment.96
In addition, a broad notion of harm in sexual harassment cases is consistent
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991,97 which amended Title VII.98 The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 recognizes other forms of harm resulting from actionable
discrimination under Title VII, such as emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life.99 As explained in the legislative
history of the Act, many harms of discrimination were identified as compensable
harms: “injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health, and to their
self-respect and dignity.”100
The Supreme Court’s own definition of “sexual harassment” indicates that
the harm from sexual harassment is broader than simply the acts of harassment.
For example, the Court has held that for sexually harassing behavior to be
legally cognizable it has to be so severe or pervasive as “‘to alter the conditions
of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”101
Under Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,102 the employee herself has to feel that the
harassment is severe or pervasive, and the harassment has to be severe or
pervasive to the reasonable person.103 Thus, an employee’s perception of the
sexual harassment is included in the calculation of what constitutes sexual
harassment. Accordingly, if an employee takes actions that prevent unwanted
sexual touching, for instance, from causing her psychological injury, the
employee’s own actions may prevent the abusive conduct from becoming
sufficiently severe or pervasive to her.104 From this calculation we understand
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
97. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
98. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. vii, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3).
100. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602-03. As one
commentator has noted, despite the recognition of both economic and psychological harms under Title
VII, courts have tended to prioritize the economic harms, such as job-related harms, over
psychological ones, creating unnecessarily a hierarchy of harms. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 386.
101. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
102. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
103. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
104. See id. at 21-22 (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
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that the harms of sexual harassment include the psychological, emotional, and
physical responses to sexual harassment that affect whether the employee views
her work environment as abusive. It is important to note, however, that the
Supreme Court in Harris made clear that severe psychological injury is not
required for an employee to feel that the harassment is sufficiently severe or
pervasive.105 Accordingly, less severe forms of psychological injury also qualify
as “harms” from sexual harassment.106
Even the affirmative defense itself demonstrates that the concept of harm
begins with, but does not end with, the act of sexual harassment. Whereas the
employer is required to prevent and correct “any sexually harassing behavior” to
avoid liability, the employer needs to show that the employee unreasonably
failed to avoid “harm”—not simply the sexual harassment.107 To do so, she may
use the employer-provided mechanisms for addressing sexual harassment, or she
can avoid harm otherwise. Accordingly, the employer must show that the
employee failed to mitigate her cognizable injuries resulting from the sexual
harassment.
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,108 the Court described the meaning of
harm as those damages resulting from sexual harassment and that need to be
avoided or mitigated in order to “avoid harm” under the affirmative defense.109
Specifically, the Court stated that if the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use the
employer’s complaint and grievance mechanisms, the employee should not
recover for any damages that could have been avoided by using the

abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s
employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”).
105. See id. at 22 (“So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived,
as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.” (citation omitted)).
106. It is important to note that tangible psychological harm or injury is not required for a hostile
work environment to violate Title VII. Id. at 22; see also Marks, supra note 6, at 1433 n.190 (discussing
“gradual-onset” cases which “contemplate[] a gradual building of incidents that eventually crosses
Title VII’s abuse threshold”). Discussing only the harm of sexual harassment, Marks states that only if
plaintiff’s dilatory behavior in reporting contributes to the sexual harassment should it impact
recovery. See id. at 1434-35 (“Because of this purportedly unreasonable delay, the court decided, as a
matter of law, that the plaintiff could recover nothing for the rape, even though the plaintiff’s delay—
which, of course, came after the sudden rape—bore absolutely no causal connect to the occurrence of
the rape.” (footnote omitted)). Marks therefore notes that the “[h]arm-avoidance analysis under
Ellerth and Faragher thus contemplates the possible avoidance of a truly imprecise and intangible type
of legal harm.” Id. at 1448. Specifically, it is imprecise because it is difficult to distinguish between
nonactionable and actionable misconduct that does not rest on “actual harm” but legal harm. Id. at
1447-48.
107. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added).
108. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
109. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07 (stating that requiring employer to show that “the employee
has failed in a coordinate duty to avoid or mitigate harm reflects an equally obvious policy imported
from the general theory of damages, that a victim has a duty ‘to use such means as are reasonable
under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages’” (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458
U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982)).
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mechanisms.110 Additionally, if the employer would be held liable, no damages
should be awarded for harm that could have been mitigated but was not.111 A
commentator succinctly stated that in making the above pronouncements, the
Court was incorporating the “harm-avoidance concept,” which does not look at
“whether, or to what extent, a negligent plaintiff is blameworthy and thus
undeserving of compensation; instead, the fact finder tries to determine how
much harm the plaintiff should have avoided.”112 Much of the law, therefore, has
defined harm broadly—from employment harms to economic harms to
psychological harms.
2.

Harms Documented in Workplace and Social Science Studies

A broad range of injuries resulting from sexual harassment are documented
in workplace and other social science studies as well.113 The 1995 MSPB
workplace study estimated the following job-related harms from sexual
harassment over a two year period. First, the study documented $4.4 million in
lost wages due to the taking of leave without pay.114 In addition, the study
concluded that 973,000 hours of annual leave were taken as a result of sexual
harassment.115 In addition, employees subjected to sexual harassment may have
resigned, been terminated, or faced reassignment as a result of the sexual
harassment.116 And twenty-one percent of the workers subjected to sexual
harassment in the federal workplace study reported that they suffered a decline
in productivity as a result of the sexual harassment.117
The MSPB’s 1995 federal workplace study also documented economic,
emotional, psychological, and physical harms as a result of sexual harassment.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 807.
112. Marks, supra note 6, at 1445-46 (emphasis omitted) (citing DOBBS, supra note 79, at 510-11).
113. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 13-27
(evaluating definition of sexual harassment and its impact on federal employees); Fitzgerald et al.,
supra note 29, at 117-38 (examining internal and external ways that women respond to sexual
harassment). Well before the Supreme Court’s articulation of the affirmative defense to employer
liability for supervisor sexual harassment, social psychologists were researching responses to sexual
harassment as a way of informing the discourse about whether sexual harassment was “unwelcome.”
See generally Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 130-32 (discussing how courts have construed person’s
failure to speak up as welcoming advances or comments, and person who “go[es] along” with situation
as consenting to sexual behavior). See, for example, BEINER, supra note 39, at 62-96, for a more indepth discussion of the social science research regarding sexual harassment, including responses to
sexual harassment and their impact on the law, and Krieger, supra note 6, at 177-98, for a discussion of
how social science research on responses to sexual harassment should inform the “reasonableness” of
an employee’s failure to use an employer’s preventive and corrective mechanisms under the
affirmative defense. In addition, Professor Beiner discusses the “great promise” social science research
holds for clarifying the legal doctrine in sexual harassment cases even though methodological
difficulties and the preliminary and incomplete nature of some of the research results in an imperfect
fit between law and social science research. BEINER, supra note 39, at 2-14.
114. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 26.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Specifically, the study reported that “[f]or employees who experience it, sexual
harassment takes its toll in the form of mental and emotional stress and even loss
of income, if victims leave their jobs or take leave without pay as a result of their
experiences.”118 One survey respondent stated: “‘[m]y stomach would get sick
when I’d hear his chair creak—because I knew he’d be coming back to my desk.
I actually even had nightmares involving this man . . . .’”119 Another survey
respondent recounted “‘[h]e has repeatedly, since I have worked there, said
disgusting and vulgar things about women. I have gone home or stayed home
many times so I wouldn’t have to face him or hear the remarks he would make
throughout the day.’”120 And another survey respondent reported “‘I can
perform under normal pressure very well, but added mental stress has reduced
my productivity. I had to take time to report, talk about it, seek medical and
mental assistance.’”121 Yet another stated:
“I was very upset by his request for a sexual favor. My superior
performance rating was lowered by him to fully acceptable. I did not
want to hurt his career, but it hurt mine. I felt I must resign. After six
months on unemployment, which was very degrading, I returned to
work with the government, having to take a downgrade. This
experience has left me very bitter and down on myself and my
abilities.”122
Even though a low percentage of victims of sexual harassment received medical
or emotional help, many more reported that they would have found such help
beneficial.123
Similarly, social science research offers identified categories of harm
resulting from sexual harassment beyond the act of discrimination itself. Dr.
Louise Fitzgerald and her colleagues (hereinafter collectively referred to as
Fitzgerald) defines sexual harassment as a psychological stress where the person
subjected to the sexual harassment is harmed because she views her relationship
with her environment as “taxing or exceeding [her] resources” and endangering
her well-being.124 Fitzgerald has identified four categories of harm resulting from

118. Id. at 23. Similarly, Martha Chamallas has demonstrated that economic and psychological
harms are interrelated injuries. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 384-85. See infra notes 151-54 and
accompanying text for a discussion of physical and psychological harms associated with sexual
harassment.
119. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 23 (omission in
original).
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id. at 25.
122. Id. at 27.
123. See id. at 26 tbl.6 (showing that whereas only three percent of victims of sexual harassment
reported receiving medical or emotional help, seven percent reported that such help would have been
beneficial).
124. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 123-24 (quoting RICHARD S. LAZARUS & SUSAN
FOLKMAN, STRESS, APPRAISAL, & COPING 21 (1984)) (emphasizing perception of woman who is
sexually harassed in definition of sexual harassment); see also LAZARUS & FOLKMAN, supra, at 21
(recognizing that definition of stress accounts for relationship between person and environment);
Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 697 (noting sexual harassment is stressful situation that can exceed
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sexual harassment. First, her research identifies a multitude of job-related harms,
including decreased satisfaction with coworkers and supervision, work
withdrawal or absenteeism, increased willingness to change jobs, more time
spent thinking about leaving the job, and increased job stress.125 Similar findings
have been made by other social psychologists as well.126 Second, Dr. Fitzgerald’s
research documents severe psychological harms, such as posttraumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”), a psychological disorder in which the person experiences a
decrease in life satisfaction, a worsening of emotional condition, and a decrease
in self-esteem.127 Third, she has identified numerous emotional harms, including
increased anger, fear, depression, anxiety, loss of self-esteem, and feelings of
alienation.128 Finally, Dr. Fitzgerald identified physical harms resulting from
sexual harassment, such as gastrointestinal disturbances, jaw tightness, teeth
grinding, nervousness, binge eating, headaches, inability to sleep, tiredness,
nausea, loss of appetite, weight loss, and crying spells.129
Others have identified similar harms, even identifying five categories of
harm from sexual harassment: “emotional and physical reactions; changes in selfperception; social, interpersonal relatedness; sexual effects; and career

resources of harassed (citing GUTEK, supra note 36, at 46; AN UPDATE, supra note 36, at 11; IS IT A
PROBLEM?, supra note 36, at 36; Peggy Crull, Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job:
Implications for Counseling, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539, 539-44 (1982); Nancy DiTomaso,
Sexuality in the Workplace: Discrimination and Harassment, in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION 71,
71-90 (Jeff Hearn et al. eds., 1989); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual
Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 171 (1988); Barbara A.
Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations: Consequences of and Coping
with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 32-35 (1993))).
125. Louise F. Fitzgerald & Alayne J. Ormerod, Breaking Silence: The Sexual Harassment of
Women in Academia and the Workplace, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: A HANDBOOK OF ISSUES AND
THEORIES 553, 573-74 (Florence L. Denmark & Michele A. Paludi eds., 1993); cf. Ellen I. Shupe et al.,
The Incidence and Outcomes of Sexual Harassment Among Hispanic and Non-Hispanic White Women:
A Comparison Across Levels of Cultural Affiliation, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 298, 305 (2002) (showing
that Hispanic women least associated with U.S. culture revealed greater dissatisfaction with work and
coworkers when sexually harassed than women more associated with culture).
126. E.g., Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 688 (noting that those subjected to sexual harassment
“may experience career interruption, lower productivity, less job satisfaction, lower self-confidence,
loss of motivation, deterioration of interpersonal relationships, and loss of commitment to work and
employer” (citing GUTEK, supra note 36, at 2-3; AN UPDATE, supra note 36, at 11; IS IT A PROBLEM?,
supra note 36, at 36; Crull, supra note 124, at 539; DiTomaso, supra note 124, at 78-88; Louise F.
Fitzgerald et al., The Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in Organizations: An
Integrated Model, in JOB STRESS IN A CHANGING WORKFORCE: INVESTIGATING GENDER, DIVERSITY,
AND FAMILY ISSUES 55 (Gwendolyn Puryear Keita & Joseph J. Hurrell, Jr. eds., 1994); Fitzgerald et
al., supra note 124, at 170-71; Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 33)).
127. Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 573-74 (noting enormous psychological costs
associated with sexual harassment); cf. Shupe et al., supra note 125, at 306 (observing that sexual
harassment was linked with decreased life satisfaction and increased psychological distress for
Hispanic women who participated in study).
128. Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 573-74.
129. See id. (citing GUTEK, supra note 36, at 2-3; Crull, supra note 124, at 539) (listing potential
physical harms from sexual harassment); see also Shupe et al., supra note 125, at 298 (finding higher
rates of anxiety and depression in Hispanic women who were subjected to sexual harassment).
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effects.”130 Clearly, there is overlap between these categories. As one scholar has
noted, sexual harassment:
affects not only career opportunities and job satisfaction but also has
personal implications that go beyond the workplace. The impact on
victims is somewhat difficult to study because it is multidimensional,
including effects on physical health, mental health, and “work variables
including attendance, morale, performance, and impact on career
track.”131
Another study also shows that people subjected to workplace sexual
harassment suffer job-related harms and psychological and physical harms.132
And in fact such harms are often interrelated.133 Sexual harassment may affect
the interpersonal relationships in the workplace.134 Sexual harassment that
involves ostracism of the target of the harassment may lead to additional
intangible job harms, such as loss of mentorship, as well as “decreased learning
and networking opportunities, which can lead to decreased work
opportunities.”135 Many studies have shown that supervisor sexual harassment
was strongly correlated to decreased job satisfaction as well.136 For instance, one
study showed that supervisor sexual harassment correlated to women’s “lower
levels of satisfaction with work, supervision, and promotion as well as with
higher levels of role ambiguity, role conflict, and stress.”137 Another showed that
sexual harassment of all levels of severity negatively impacted job satisfaction
and work productivity.138
Other studies corroborated Fitzgerald’s finding of multiple physical harms
resulting from sexual harassment. These physical harms include “stomach and
appetite problems, sleep disorders, headaches, and crying spells.”139

130. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 6, at 320-21 (citing Karen Maitland
Schilling & Ann Fuehrer, The Organizational Context of Sexual Harassment (1998), reprinted in
MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 123, 129-30 (1991)). Researchers have labeled these effects of
sexual harassment as “Sexual Harassment Trauma Syndrome.” Id. at 320 (citing PALUDI &
BARICKMAN, supra, at 27, 29-30 tbl.2.1).
131. BEINER, supra note 39, at 185 (quoting Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 30).
132. Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 30.
133. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between
job-related, psychological, and physical harms.
134. BEINER, supra note 39, at 186.
135. Id. (citing Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 31-32).
136. E.g., id. at 186-87 (noting that sexual harassment appears to have effect on job satisfaction
(citing David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, The Effects of Sexual Harassment on Job Satisfaction,
Earnings, and Turnover Among Female Lawyers, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 594, 599-600 (1998);
Vicki J. Magley et al., The Impact of Sexual Harassment on Military Personnel: Is it the Same for Men
and Women?, 11 MIL. PSYCHOL. 283, 297 (1999); Paula C. Morrow et al., Sexual Harassment Behaviors
and Work Related Perceptions and Attitudes, 45 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 295, 303 (1994))).
137. Id. at 187 (citing Morrow et al., supra note 136, at 303).
138. Id. (citing Magley et al., supra note 136, at 297).
139. BEINER, supra note 39, at 187; see also Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick, Effects of
Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 152, 168
(William O’Donohue ed., 1997) (cataloging health-related effects of sexual harassment).
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Unfortunately, the research is limited as to all of the physical harms of sexual
harassment.140
Finally, studies have shown that there are many psychological effects of
sexual harassment. Included in the psychological effects are “anger, fear,
depression, anxiety, helplessness, and vulnerability.”141 In addition, there are
many disorders resulting from workplace sexual harassment such as “‘[a]nxiety
disorders including panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder; somatoform
disorders, various forms of depression, and post traumatic stress disorder.’”142
Medical research shows that persons who are sexually harassed by being
physically or sexually assaulted may suffer from PTSD.143 PTSD is not a disorder
specific to sexual harassment but rather results when one is subjected to “an
extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that
involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one’s
physical integrity.”144 In addition, another large study showed that women who
were subjected to supervisor sexual harassment were more likely to be diagnosed
with psychiatric disorders such as major depressive disorder and PTSD.145
Of course, the employment-related harms of sexual harassment are tied
closely to the physical and psychological harms. One study found that:
[W]omen who experienced high levels of harassment reported the
worst job-related and psychological outcomes; women who were not
sexually harassed reported the lowest negative outcomes. Women who
reported moderate levels of harassment likewise had significantly
worse outcomes than women who were not harassed. Even low levels
of harassment increased negative outcomes.146
Professor Chamallas’s work demonstrating that economic and psychological
harms are job-related injuries is highly relevant to sexual harassment harms
analysis.147 Chamallas argues that economic injury can lead to psychological
harm.148 For instance, when an employer takes an adverse action against the
employee, the employee may then suffer from corresponding stress over
economic opportunities and job security; similarly, an employee’s psychological
distress resulting from the sexual harassment can lead to economic harm because
140. BEINER, supra note 39, at 187 (citing Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 139, at 164).
141. Id. (citing Gutek & Koss, supra note 124, at 33).
142. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jane Goodman-Delahunty & William E. Foote,
Compensation for Pain, Suffering, and Other Psychological Injuries: The Impact of Daubert on
Employment Discrimination Claims, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 183, 188 (1995)).
143. Id. at 158 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL]). If
someone has suffered PTSD in the past, then less severe forms of sexual harassment can also trigger
PTSD. Id.
144. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra note 143, at 424.
145. Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 139, at 166-67 figs.9-1 & 9-2.
146. BEINER, supra note 39, at 188 (citing Kimberly T. Schneider et al., Job-Related and
Psychological Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two
Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 412-13 (1997)).
147. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 384-85.
148. Id. at 384.
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the employee may have difficulty in being as motivated or productive in the
workplace.149 In fact, the Supreme Court opinion in Harris lends support to
Chamallas’s argument. In Harris, the Court showed that psychological harm,
even if not severe, is interconnected to economic harm when it noted that “[a]
discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously
affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from
employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job,
or keep them from advancing in their careers.”150
One study has indicated that there is a relation between the intensity of the
sexual harassment and the resulting psychological and physical harms.
Nevertheless, the data suggests that the employer’s taking of negative tangible
job action, such as the termination or transferring of an employee, may result
more from retaliation than from the sexual harassment itself.151 More research is
needed in this area to help determine the linkage between sexual harassment,
the reporting of sexual harassment, and the job-related and other harms.152 As
seen from the MSPB study discussed earlier, there does appear to be a
relationship between the sexual harassment and job-related harm apart from any
retaliation. In that study, employees reported quite a bit of job-related harm that
resulted from the sexual harassment itself and not from the reporting of the
sexual harassment.153 For instance, eight percent of the employees subjected to
sexual harassment reported using sick leave, eight percent reported using annual
leave, one percent used leave without pay, two percent were reassigned or fired,
two percent were transferred to a new job, and twenty-one percent reported a
decline in productivity.154
One thing that is clear, however, is that there are multiple forms of harm
and that the harms, at times, are interconnected. In addition, the harms from
sexual harassment that are documented in the social science research strongly
comport with those harms recognized under Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of
1991.155

149. Id. at 384-85.
150. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
151. BEINER, supra note 39, at 164 (citing Matthew S. Hesson-McInnis & Louise F. Fitzgerald,
Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 877, 896
(1997)).
152. Id. at 164-65 (hypothesizing that different results regarding frequency of termination of
sexual harassment victims may be explained by whether victim filed formal complaint, as those who
were sexually harassed and filed formal complaints were fired in much larger numbers than their
counterparts who declined to file complaints (citing SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 26 tbl.6; Frances S. Coles, Forced to Quit: Sexual Harassment
Complaints and Agency Response, 14 SEX ROLES 81, 89 (1986))).
153. See supra notes 114-23 for a discussion of the harms resulting from sexual harassment as
documented by the MSPB study.
154. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 26 tbl.6.
155. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practices), and
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (allowing compensatory damages for “emotional pain, suffering, mental
anguish, [and] loss of enjoyment of life,” but limiting such damages).
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Lena’s Harms

Returning to Lena’s situation, application of the expanded understanding of
“harm” derived from the affirmative defense to employer liability for supervisor
sexual harassment, Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, workplace studies,
and social science research, facilitates identification of the numerous forms of
harm suffered by Lena. She has endured a year of unwelcome, severe, and
pervasive touching on various parts of her body. In addition to being sexually
harassed and discriminated against, she has suffered various intangible job,
economic, psychological, and emotional harms. As a result of Dave’s sexual
harassment, Lena has suffered loss of enjoyment of her job. She now dreads
what used to be her passion. She has withdrawn from work as a consequence of
the sexual harassment, thus impacting her ability to gain overtime pay. She is
also taking sick leave. She is feeling anxious, on edge, and stressed. She is
suffering emotional pain and suffering in that she has difficulty sleeping, has a
decreased appetite, and a loss of joy. She feels humiliated by Victor’s joking
about Dave’s actions. Finally, she is worried that if she complains, she will be
made fun of further, will be ostracized, and might even lose her job.
B.

Harm Avoidance

Having identified all of the harms from sexual harassment, the harm
avoidance actions in response to these harms must be identified. In fact, the acts
taken to “avoid harm” from sexual harassment are more diverse than filing a
formal complaint of sexual harassment. One workplace study summarized the
reality, which is that “[t]he range of responses for a victim of sexually harassing
behavior is probably as vast as the range of human behavior itself.”156 The law
and social science research again assist the understanding of what harm
avoidance mechanisms are relevant to a supervisor sexual harassment liability
determination.
1. Legal and Social Science Support for Identifying Harm Avoidance
Mechanisms
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s rationale for the employeefocused prong of the affirmative defense specifically relied on the avoidable
consequences doctrine.157 One of the avoidable consequences doctrine’s goals is
“to discourage even persons against whom wrongs have been committed from
passively suffering economic loss which could be averted by reasonable
efforts.”158 Accordingly, the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the
employee-focused prong is grounded in preventing and mitigating harm. It is not
grounded in notice or conciliation rationales. Therefore, the analysis of the
“avoid harm otherwise” component is not restricted to acts informing the
156. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 29.
157. See supra notes 62-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the avoidable consequences
doctrine.
158. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 127.
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employer of the sexual harassment or acts utilizing the employer’s processes for
complaining about and resolving the sexual harassment.159
Similarly, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 shows the
importance of accounting for all employee harm avoidance mechanisms.
Explaining the need for providing compensatory damages to victims of
discrimination, the House Report stated that “[m]onetary damages simply raise
the cost of an employer’s engaging in intentional discrimination, thereby
providing employers with additional incentives to prevent intentional
discrimination in the workplace before it happens.”160 The affirmative defense
operates to decrease monetary damages if the employee fails to avoid all
otherwise compensable harms.
To understand how employees avoid the harms of sexual harassment, social
psychology research and employer workplace surveys are again instructive.161 It
is important to note that some of the early research is limited because it was
based on persons who were not subjected to sexual harassment. As recent social
psychology research has shown, such prior sexual harassment studies were
methodologically flawed.162 Those studies reported what persons who had never
experienced sexual harassment hypothesized would be their response to sexual
harassment.163 These responses did not correspond to those of real victims of
sexual harassment.164 In addition, the prior literature is limited because the
studies tended to ask about “active” or “passive” responses only and did not
request narrative descriptions of what the responses were.165
Recent studies have created new typologies, discussed below, to identify
and research more completely the multitude of responses of women who are
sexually harassed.166 These typologies are modifications of the past incomplete
ones, which inaccurately categorized responses into “active” and “passive”
responses.167 Unfortunately, even the new typologies, though more inclusive in

159. See infra Parts V.B-C for a discussion of the applicability of the notice and conciliation
rationales to the affirmative defense.
160. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 603.
161. See generally BEINER, supra note 39, at 82-83 (discussing social science literature regarding
women’s responses to sexual harassment); SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE,
supra note 12, at 26-45 (detailing employees’ reactions to sexual harassment); Fitzgerald et al., supra
note 29, at 119-23 (reviewing surveys reporting victim responses to sexual harassment).
162. E.g., Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 119 (describing earlier studies of harm avoidance as
useful “starting point” but discounting value of these studies because they “are not derived from the
reactions of actual victims”).
163. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 6, at 292-93.
164. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 119; see also Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge,
supra note 6, at 291-94 (noting value of social science research in determining how harassment occurs
in workplace and exploring legal standard despite various limitations regarding data).
165. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 119.
166. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 6, at 177-90 (surveying social science research regarding
externally focused and internally focused response mechanisms).
167. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 118-19. Interestingly, social psychologists’ early research
on responses to sexual harassment was flawed in much the same way current legal discourse is flawed;
early research was limited to studying only one response to sexual harassment—the filing of a formal
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the responses being studied, do not identify how the responses impact all of the
harms resulting from sexual harassment. Therefore both the recent and the older
studies do not address fully the effectiveness of the various responses of harassed
employees in avoiding the harm.168 As a result, the discussion below is a
beginning of what will hopefully be a call for research on how all of the
responses women employees take in response to sexual harassment affect the
various harms resulting from the harassment.
Although more research is needed in this area, as the following discussion
indicates, current social science research does provide insight into employee
harm avoidance actions.169 In a study conducted by Dr. Louise Fitzgerald and
her colleagues regarding responses to sexual harassment, they identified various
coping mechanisms used by those subjected to sexual harassment in order to
avoid harm.170 Fitzgerald identified that “‘coping (represents) constantly
changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or
internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the
person.’”171 These cognitive and behavioral responses by women are undertaken
“to manage or alter the distressing situation itself (problem-focused coping)”172
and “to regulate emotional reaction (emotion-focused coping).”173
Based on the stress and coping literature, Dr. Fitzgerald’s research created a
new typology that includes both the “problem-focused” and the “emotionfocused” responses used by women subjected to sexual harassment.174 The
“problem-focused” responses are externally focused responses that center on the
complaint. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 690. Accordingly, Knapp, Fitzgerald, and others have
created conceptual frameworks that permit the “full range of responses to [sexual harassment] to be
identified.” Id.; see, e.g., Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 23-26 (discussing victims’
responses to sexual harassment, including not filing formal complaints; responding with mild
retributions; responding nonassertively, such as ignoring, rationalizing, avoiding the harasser, job, or
situation; and identifying cognitive strategies for responses, including internally and externally focused
responses”).
168. The research shows that while many of the strategies to avoid harm may be effective in
decreasing some forms of harm, the same strategies may actually increase other forms of harm. See
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 (noting that avoidance of
harasser may improve situation by removing victim from harassment but, conversely, may lead to
decrease in productivity); see also Krieger, supra note 6, at 190-92 (discussing effectiveness of
employees’ avoidance strategies and risks of confrontational alternatives). The tension between these
strategies and their effect on the harm resulting from sexual harassment is an invaluable part of the
necessary discourse in this area.
169. See, e.g., Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 6, at 312-23 (discussing
harm avoidance responses to sexual harassment and effects of sexual harassment on reporting).
170. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 127-28. Fitzgerald created this typology in response to case
law finding that inaction or submission by women in response to sexual harassment indicated
welcomeness to the harassing behavior, thus invalidating their claim of discrimination. Id. at 129-34.
171. Id. at 126 (quoting LAZARUS & FOLKMAN, supra note 124, at 178).
172. Id. at 127.
173. Id.
174. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 128. The responses to sexual harassment result from the
victim’s assessment of the degree of danger posed by the unwanted conduct and the opportunities
available at the time. Id. at 129; see also Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 572-73 (analyzing
reasons for women’s responses, or lack of responses, to sexual harassment).
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woman’s attempts to prevent future harassment.175 The “emotion-focused”
responses include the various internally focused responses that look to the
woman’s personal coping strategies.176 All of these responses demonstrate
employees’ harm avoidance actions in response to sexual harassment.177
2.

Externally Focused Harm Avoidance Mechanisms

The external coping mechanisms, or those strategies utilized to solve,
manage, or alter the distressing situation itself, include a wide range of responses
extending beyond a formal complaint to the employer pursuant to a
nonharassment policy. As repeatedly discussed in the social psychology
literature, the filing of a formal complaint is the least likely external response
taken by women subjected to sexual harassment.178 These findings are confirmed

175. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120-21.
176. Id. at 119-20. Fitzgerald cautions that the internally focused coping strategies have been
underresearched due to the excessive focus on externally focused coping strategies. Id.
177. Fitzgerald notes that a particular response to sexual harassment cannot be judged for
appropriateness or effectiveness without consideration of the individual woman herself because each
response is influenced by factors such as the woman’s cognitive evaluation of the situation’s ability to
impact her well-being, her evaluation of realistic and available options, and personal and situational
resources and constraints. Id. at 129; see also Krieger, supra note 6, at 181 (recognizing that social
science research shows that women employ many “reasonable” responses to cope with sexual
harassment in workplace, including internally focused actions and externally focused behaviors).
178. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 121 (stating that seeking institutional relief, whether
by bringing formal complaint, filing charges, or taking some other institutionally prescribed steps,
against harasser is least common response to sexual harassment and is used primarily when other
responses have proved unsuccessful); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 23-26 (stating
that formal complaints are least likely response to sexual harassment based on Fitzgerald’s research
and federal government studies of its workforce); Krieger, supra note 6, at 182-83 (describing various
studies showing that between five to fifteen percent of employees seek organizational relief in
response to sexual harassment); Schneider et al., supra note 146, at 408 tbl.2 (indicating that only
13.3% of private sector sample victims filed complaint; only 6% of university sample victims filed a
complaint; 35.7% of sample one victims discussed situation with a supervisor or union representative;
and 17.4% of sample two victims discussed the situation with a supervisor or union representative);
Shupe et al., supra note 125, at 304 (indicating that Hispanic women least associated with U.S. culture
have lowest report rate for sexual harassment while Hispanic women moderately affiliated with U.S.
culture have higher report rates, and non-Hispanic white women have even higher report rates); S.
Arzu Wasti & Lilia M. Cortina, Coping in Context: Sociocultural Determinants of Responses to Sexual
Harassment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 394, 402 (2002) (noting that even though Turkish,
Hispanic American, and Anglo American working women all tended not to report or file complaint
about being sexually harassed, Hispanic working class women were less likely than Anglo American
working class women to report harassment). But see Janice D. Yoder & Patricia Aniakudo, The
Responses of African American Women Firefighters to Gender Harassment at Work, 32 SEX ROLES
125, 130 (1995) (stating that fifty-five percent of African American women firefighters who were
participants in study filed some sort of complaint); cf. Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’
Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83,
87 (2005) (interpreting Yoder and Aniakudo study to show that “resistance to sexual harassment is
shaped by specific organizational settings characterized by particular power arrangements”).
Given the social science research and the current case law’s limiting of liability under the
affirmative defense rubric, one set of scholars posits that the result is a “perverse incentive for
employers” who seek to avoid liability to “exercise just enough reasonable care to satisfy a court, but
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in the 1995 MSPB federal workplace study which reported that only twelve
percent of workers who were subjected to unwanted sexual harassment reported
the sexual harassment to a supervisor or other official.179 When examining the
same response by gender, sixteen percent of the male workers and thirteen
percent of the female workers reported the sexual harassment to a supervisor or
other official.180 In the same federal workplace study, only six percent of the
victims of sexual harassment actually made a formal complaint of sexual
harassment.181 In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, a smaller percentage of women
reported, in some manner, the sexual harassment than in 1995 (thirty-eight
percent in 1995 versus thirty percent in 2002).182 This decline is especially
interesting because, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court opined that the
affirmative defense, articulated in 1998, would encourage more employees to
report than before the affirmative defense emerged in the legal doctrine.183 The
2002 study shows that although reporting behavior has changed since the
affirmative defense was created, the reporting behavior has decreased rather
than increased.
Importantly, some research has provided insight into employees’ decisions
to not report sexual harassment by indicating that filing a formal complaint can,
in many ways, worsen the employment situation of the employee and increase
other harms to the employee.184 For instance, the 1995 MSPB federal workplace
study reported that filing a formal complaint made the situation worse for more
employees subjected to sexual harassment.185 Studies have shown that employees
not enough to make it easy or comfortable for employees to complain of workplace harassment.”
Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1267.
179. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 374 (citing SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 30). These results are consistent with earlier studies of federal workers
showing that 11% reported their sexual harassment to superiors, but only 2.5% actually used the
appropriate formal mechanisms to report. Id. (citing Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual
Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 497, 498 (1991)). These results are also
consistent with the raw data from the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, which showed that 85.5% of
employees did not report the situation to their immediate supervisor, 89.8% of employees did not
report it to someone else in their chain of command, 88.1% of employees did not report it to the
supervisor of the person who was engaging in the sexually harassing behavior, 95.9% of employees did
not report it to the special military office responsible for handling these complaints, and 97.5% of
employees did not report the behavior to any other military person or office. GREENLEES ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 1229, 1233, 1237, 1241, 1245.
180. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 tbl.9.
181. Id. at 33-34.
182. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 30. In fact, fewer than ten percent of
employees who experienced incidents of sexual harassment reported it to the designated office
handling sexual harassment complaints or another official. Id. Instead, twenty-one percent of women
and twelve percent of men reported to their immediate supervisor, and sixteen percent of women and
ten percent of men reported to the offender’s supervisor. Id.
183. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
184. See Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 139, at 158 (providing insight into employees’ decisions
not to file formal complaints); Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 3 (demonstrating
that sexual harassment policies are not necessarily effective in deterring, preventing, or correcting
sexual harassment).
185. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 34 (finding that
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who file complaints have experienced retaliation. One study showed that onethird of the reporters were subjected to retaliation by the employer.186 Another
one showed that sixty-two percent of the reporters were subjected to retaliation
by the employer.187 The 2002 Armed Forces Survey found that twenty-nine
percent of women and twenty-three percent of men reported experiencing workrelated difficulties as the result of sexual harassment or the reporting of it.188
The 2002 study also showed that women did not report the sexual
harassment for numerous other reasons, including because they felt
uncomfortable making a report (thirty-seven percent); because they doubted
that reporting would have any effect (thirty percent); because they thought they
would be labeled a troublemaker if they reported (twenty-nine percent); because
they did not want to hurt the sexual harasser’s career, family or feelings (twentyeight percent); because they thought their coworkers would be angry if they
reported (twenty-three percent); because they feared retaliation from the sexual
harasser (eighteen percent); because they doubted that they would be believed
(fifteen percent); because they wanted to fit in (fifteen percent); because they
thought reporting would negatively impact their performance evaluation or
promotion consideration (fourteen percent); and because they feared retaliation
from the sexual harasser’s friends (thirteen percent).189 Similarly, other research
showed that employees did not report because of their “ambivalence about
[sexual harassment] policies and the personnel who administer them.”190
Specifically, several federal workers explained their skepticism of formally
complaining about sexual harassment because “they were worried that they
would be blamed for the incident, that they would not be believed, or that the
complaint would not be kept confidential.”191 The group also worried “that
management’s reaction to the complaint would be at best ineffectual and at
worst threatening.”192 Because official sexual harassment policies and
procedures “reflect the power dynamics at work in particular organizations . . .

filing of formal complaint for thirty-seven percent of victims of sexual harassment made things worse
and helped only twenty-one percent of them).
186. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 375 (citing Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 123).
187. Id. Dr. Patricia A. Frazier, PhD, after conducting a literature review, found that retaliation
occurs in about one out of four of the cases where the person subjected to sexual harassment formally
complained. Patricia A. Frazier, Overview of Sexual Harassment from the Behavioral Science
Perspective, A.B.A. CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Oct. 15-18, 1997, at *6, available at
Westlaw, N97SHCB ABA-LGLED B-1. Frazier also noted that twelve percent of women reported
lower evaluations after complaining, seven percent reported being denied promotions, five percent
reported being terminated, and two percent reported being reassigned. Id. (citing Pamela Hewitt Loy
& Lea P. Stewart, The Extent and Effects of the Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 17 SOC. FOCUS
31, 40 (1984)).
188. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at v.
189. Id. at 34 tbl.4.12.
190. Marshall, supra note 178, at 87.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also BEINER, supra note 39, at 161 (“‘[O]rganizational factors were the best
predictors of response when severity of harassment was controlled.’” (quoting Fitzgerald et al., supra
note 29, at 122)).
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[they] may dampen rather than promote employee complaints.”193 In addition,
many women subjected to sexual harassment did not complain formally about
the harassment because they believed such complaints would be ineffective.194 In
fact, recent research has found that managers were more likely to side with the
harasser, seen as the “institution,” over the complainant, seen as the
“troublemaker.”195
In addition, some studies showed that persons subjected to sexual
harassment do not report it because they do not recognize it as sexual
harassment.196 For instance, the 2002 Armed Forces Survey showed that sixtyseven percent of women and seventy-eight percent of men stated that they did
not report incidents of sexual harassment because they felt that the situation was
not important enough to warrant reporting.197
Further, many employees do not report sexual harassment formally because
it would cause other and greater harms to them. For instance, one study showed
that women who complain about sexual harassment are often fired or may face
difficulty securing other employment because of bad references.198 One study
suggested that “‘negative job outcomes may derive more from retaliation and
negative organizational response (e.g., victim blaming) than from the sexually
harassing behavior itself.’”199 Another study showed female blue-collar workers
who confronted their harassers were subjected to more harassment and
ostracism.200 Another study showed that:
assertive and formal responses were actually associated with more
negative outcomes of every sort. Women who reported harassment to
their supervisors or who filed complaints were more likely to quit, be
fired, or be transferred; to need or utilize medical and psychological
assistance; to feel worse about their jobs; and so forth.201

193. Marshall, supra note 178, at 87.
194. Krieger, supra note 6, at 185 (citing Laurie A. Rudman et al., Suffering in Silence:
Procedural Justice Versus Gender Socialization Issues in University Sexual Harassment Grievance
Procedures, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 519, 520 (1995)).
195. Marshall, supra note 178, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. BEINER, supra note 39, at 160 (citing Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and
Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152,
171 (1988)); see also Caroline C. Cochran et al., Predictors of Responses to Unwanted Sexual Attention,
21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 207, 217 (1997) (noting that victims frequently did not report incidents
because they were unsure if behavior was harassment); Schneider et al., supra note 146, at 407 (noting
that only fifteen percent of female college students labeled their experiences as sexual harassment).
197. 2002 ARMED FORCES SURVEY, supra note 16, at 33.
198. BEINER, supra note 39, at 164 (citing Audrey Murrell et al., Sexual Harassment and Gender
Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study of Women Managers, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 139, 141 (1995)).
199. Id. (quoting Hesson-McInnis & Fitzgerald, supra note 151, at 896).
200. Kristen R. Yount, Ladies, Flirts, and Tomboys: Strategies for Managing Sexual Harassment
in an Underground Coal Mine, 19 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 396, 404 (1991).
201. Hesson-McInnis & Fitzgerald, supra note 151, at 896. Because this study is older and was
conducted before widespread public attention to sexual harassment, the authors and others note that
its findings may be limited. See BEINER, supra note 39, at 164 (recognizing that study by HessonMcInnis and Fitzgerald was conducted before increased public awareness about sexual harassment).
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In fact, one documented barrier to women employees’ filing of formal
complaints is the “embarrassment and psychological costs associated with such
complaints.”202
On the other hand, reporting harassment to a supervisor or other official
may be effective in stopping one form of harm—the harassment. The research of
Dr. Deborah Knapp and her colleagues (hereinafter referred to as Knapp’s
research) showed that “advocacy seeking” responses, including requesting
outside intervention, reporting the harassment to a supervisor or to an outside
agency, and filing a lawsuit, may be effective in ending the harassment.203 Yet a
different workplace study showed that employees felt that reporting the sexual
harassment to a supervisor or other official provided mixed results.204 These
mixed results are not surprising given the research, discussed above, that shows
that the effectiveness of reporting sexual harassment will depend on the formal
and informal organizational culture relating to complaints of sexual
harassment.205
Unfortunately, the research is silent as to other harms and how they are
affected by these “advocacy seeking” responses. For example, Knapp’s research
did not identify the effectiveness of these responses in coping with the intangible
employment harm or the psychological or emotional harm resulting from the
sexual harassment.

202. Marshall, supra note 178, at 87.
203. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 693. Knapp created another typology of responses to the
harm of psychological stress caused by sexual harassment. Her typology of coping mechanisms is
based on the context of the sexual harassment, such as the mode of response and focus of response. Id.
at 690-95. Knapp’s research drew on research regarding whistle-blowing behavior as well as coping
literature. Id. at 696-98. Knapp and her colleagues stated that the coping literature identified two types
of coping; engagement or problem-focused coping emphasized altering or preventing the situation
while disengagement or emotion-focused coping was characterized by self-blame, seeking social
support, avoidance, or distancing. Id. at 698. To determine the victim’s mode of response, Knapp
considered the amount of outside support being sought through the coping mechanism: the mode may
be self-response, which involves no outside resources to address sexual harassment, or the mode may
be a supported response, which means that the harassed woman uses others, such as individuals and
organizations, to address the sexual harassment. Id. at 691-92. When evaluating the focus of responses
to harassment, Knapp considered what the focus of the coping mechanisms was: the woman who was
harassed (self-focused) or the harasser or the event (initiator-focused). Knapp et al., supra note 36, at
690. Knapp identified four response strategies from these various modes and focuses of responses: (1)
“Avoidance/Denial,” (2) “Social Coping,” (3) “Confrontation/Negotiation,” and (4) “Advocacy
Seeking.” Id. at 690-92. Her research indicated that persons who are sexually harassed tend to employ
more than one response strategy, sometimes sequencing them. Id. at 693. Further, Knapp stated that
“response behavior may vary not only among individuals but also among different environments and
organizational contexts.” Id. at 695.
204. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 tbl.9 (noting
that thirty-three percent of male workers and fifty-eight percent of female workers stated that
reporting sexually harassing behavior to supervisor or other official had beneficial effect on sexual
harassment, sixteen percent of male workers and thirteen percent of female workers reported that it
had detrimental effect, and fifty-two percent of male workers and twenty-nine percent of female
workers stated that it had no effect on sexual harassment).
205. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of sexual
harassment complaints being filed.
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And simply because few women file complaints of sexual harassment does
not mean that they fail to respond or fail to react to the harassment in attempts
to avoid harm. In fact, women’s most common response to sexual harassment is
avoiding the harasser himself.206 It appears that those subjected to harassment
often will avoid the harassment unless the actions taken to avoid harassment
become intolerable.207 Women employees may also use defusion in response to
sexual harassment. Defusion is going along with the behavior, perhaps by
making a joke of it in order to minimize conflict or by stalling.208 Women
employees appease the harasser by attempting to stop the harasser from
engaging in sexually harassing behavior without conflict by using humor,
excuses, or delay.209 Knapp has categorized these types of behavior as an
“avoidance/denial” behavior.210 Referencing the social science research,
Chamallas stated that women may use avoidance and appeasement because they
typically have less power than men in the organization and are reluctant to use
mechanisms, such as official reporting mechanisms, created by those in power
because they tend to favor the organization or the harasser rather than not the
victim of the harassment.211
206. Schneider, supra note 146, at 408 tbl.2 (showing 74.1% of private sector victims responded
by avoiding harasser, and 53.9% of university sample victims responded by avoiding harasser). Early
research showed that fifty percent of the women subjected to sexual harassment responded by
avoiding the harassers. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120; cf. Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178,
at 126 (noting that about half of federal employees avoided harasser (citing Sandra S. Tangri, Martha
R. Burt & Leanor B. Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC.
ISSUES 33, 47 (1982))); Wasti & Cortina, supra note 178, at 402 (noting that Turkish and Hispanic
American women relied on avoidance more than Anglo American women, although all women relied
increasingly on avoidance as harassment increased in frequency)). In addition, in the 2002 Armed
Forces Survey, 60.5% of employees to some extent stayed out of the harasser’s way and 48.8% of
employees to some extent avoided being alone with the harasser. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 30, at
1169, 1193.
207. BEINER, supra note 39, at 160.
208. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 129; see also Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 689 (stating
that defusion also includes such actions as stalling (citing James E. Gruber, How Women Handle
Sexual Harassment: A Literature Review, 74 SOC. & SOC. RES. 3, 3 (1989))).
209. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120. Summarizing the previous literature, Fitzgerald notes
that humor is a common response to less serious harassment. Id. (citing AN UPDATE, supra note 36, at
24; IS IT A PROBLEM?, supra note 36, at 69). Delaying tactics were used by ten percent of blue-collar
workers as a nonconfrontational way of communicating lack of interest in the harasser. Id. (citing
James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues: The Sexual Harassment of Women Autoworkers, 9
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 271, 287 tbl.3 (1982)).
210. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 690-91. “Avoidance/denial” behaviors include avoiding the
harasser, changing the job situation by quitting or transferring, ignoring the behavior, going along with
the behavior, treating the event as a joke, doing nothing, and blaming oneself. Id. at 691. Knapp’s
research shows that avoidance/denial behaviors are coping mechanisms that are self-focused and done
without outside support. Id. at 690. In a different study, twenty-five percent of female faculty reported
that ignoring the sexually harassing behavior was effective. Frazier, supra note 187, at *6 (citing
Elizabeth Grauerholz, Sexual Harassment of Women Professors by Students: Exploring the Dynamics
of Power, Authority, and Gender in a University Setting, 21 SEX ROLES 789, 797 tbl.3 (1989)).
211. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 376 (citing James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women’s Responses
to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67
SOC. SCI. Q. 814, 821 (1986); Jennie Kihnley, Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the

780

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

The effectiveness of these “avoidance/denial” behaviors in reducing all
harms seems mixed. The research shows that some of these actions reduce
certain harms while increasing others. The 1995 MSPB federal workplace study
showed that victims of sexual harassment found that avoiding the harasser
beneficially affected the sexual harassment.212 On the other hand, the MSPB
study hypothesized, without offering any supporting data, that avoiding the
harasser “can also have a negative effect on the victim’s work performance, if
she or he spends a lot of time trying to avoid the harasser.”213 Commentators
have found that actions to avoid the harasser and ignore the harassment may
create additional benefits, such as avoiding potential retaliation, for victims.214
The same MSPB study showed mixed results for defusion responses to
sexual harassment as well. One commentator noted that making a joke of the
harassment “may well be an attempt by the target [of the sexual harassment] to
fit in and downplay the effects of the harassment.”215 Another study showed that
women miners who tried to fit in and be “one of the boys” were subjected to less
harassment.216
Dr. Knapp’s research looked at these behaviors as a whole under the
category of “avoidance/denial” behaviors. Dr. Knapp and her colleagues found
that these behaviors are coping mechanisms that are generally more effective
than other strategies in ending one specific type of harm: the sexual harassment
behavior.217 Their findings do not indicate whether these behaviors are effective
at ending the emotional harm, the psychological harm, the tangible employment
harm, or the intangible employment harm resulting from sexual harassment.

Handling of Sexual Harassment Complaints, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 86 (2000); Riger, supra note
179, at 501).
212. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 tbl.19 (noting
fifty-two percent of male employees and forty-four percent of female employees found that avoiding
harasser beneficially affected sexual harassment, thirteen percent of male employees and eight percent
of female employees found that such behavior negatively affected sexual harassment, and thirty-six
percent of male employees and forty-eight percent of female employees found that avoiding harasser
had no impact on sexual harassment).
213. Id. at 31; see also BEINER, supra note 39, at 83 (avoiding harasser may interfere with
employee’s ability to work “as the target rearranges his or her job duties to avoid the harasser” (citing
Cochran et al., supra note 196, at 223)); Frazier, supra note 187, at *6 (noting “those who avoided were
less satisfied with the outcome of the situation in another study” (citing Cochran, supra note 196, at
224)).
214. BEINER, supra note 39, at 83 (citing Aysan Sev’er, Sexual Harassment: Where We Were,
Where We Are and Prospects for the New Millennium, 36 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY
469, 478 (1999)).
215. Id. at 82.
216. Yount, supra note 200, at 416. Yount also found that female miners’ flirting resulted in
decreased harassment in the short term but in the long run led to more harassment. Id. at 407-09, 41112. The results of the MSPB study correspond to the findings of sociologist Mary Lindenstein Walshok
of various blue-collar workplaces. MARY LINDENSTEIN WALSHOK, BLUE-COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS
ON THE MALE FRONTIER 232, 239-40 (1981) (finding that female employees’ integration into dominant
group correlates to decreased targeting for sexual harassment but recognizing potential risk that fitting
in may have negative consequence that victims are seen as welcoming sexual harassment).
217. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 690-91.
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In addition to the “avoidance/denial” responses, women employees also use
so-called “assertive” responses, such as directly telling the harasser to stop,218
threatening to report the harasser,219 or verbally or physically attacking the
harasser.220 Taking each so-called “assertive” response in turn, some research
shows that the strategy of confronting the harasser is effective in ending the
harassment.221 In fact, one review of the literature identified confronting the
harasser as the most effective strategy at decreasing the harassment.222

218. Forty-four percent of female respondents in one study responded to sexual harassment by
confronting the harasser. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 121 (citing IS IT A PROBLEM?, supra note
36, at 18). In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 68.2% of employees to some extent told the harasser of
their dislike for the harassment, 61.2% of employees to some extent told the harasser to stop, and
41.3% of employees to some extent asked the harasser to leave them alone. GREENLEES ET AL., supra
note 30, at 1165, 1197, 1205; see also Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, at 130 (stating that eighty-six
percent of study participants challenged harasser); id. at 126 (noting that sixteen percent of another
study’s participants ordered harasser to stop) (citing Mary Ellen Reilly, Bernice Lott & Sheila M.
Gallogly, Sexual Harassment of University Students, 15 SEX ROLES 333, 346 (1986)). In one study,
twenty-four percent of the subjects proposed that the sexual harassment victim verbally challenge the
harasser or inform authorities of the harassment. Tricia S. Jones & Martin S. Remland, Sources of
Variability in Perceptions of and Responses to Sexual Harassment, 27 SEX ROLES 121, 138 (1992); see
also Wasti & Cortina, supra note 178, at 402 (noting that Turkish women indicated greater propensity
than Hispanic American and Anglo American working women to confront harasser).
219. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 121 (stating that fourteen percent of women subjected to
sexual harassment threatened to disclose harassment to harasser’s coworkers).
220. Fifteen percent of blue-collar workers responded verbally and seven percent responded
physically. Id. at 121; see also Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, at 130 (finding that of nineteen
study participants, nine responded “assertively” and ten responded “aggressively,” including four who
used physical force). Yoder and Aniakudo’s study suggested that black female firefighters responded
to harassment first assertively with direct confrontation, then if unsuccessful, aggressively and possibly
by taking legal recourse. Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, at 135. Interestingly, Yoder and
Aniakudo hypothesized that the women used confrontation because it proved successful and
permitted them to retain their dignity. Because the women were marginalized at work, possibly due to
their gender and race, they felt that they had little to lose when challenging their harassers. Id. at 132.
Unsurprisingly, the women’s circumstances influenced their responses to sexual harassment. See
Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the Litigation Choices of Sexually Harassed
Women, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 67, 86-88 (1999) (finding that relationships with children, spouses, and
parents, and availability of moral and emotional support, influenced women’s litigation decisions, and
if filing suit appeared likely to detrimentally affect family members, women relied on “extralegal
means to solve their sexual harassment problems”).
221. E.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 (discussing
study finding that of those who asked or told person to stop, sixty-one percent of male employees and
sixty percent of female employees indicated that their response made things better regarding sexual
harassment, fifteen percent of male employees and eight percent of female employees reported that
telling harasser to stop made sexual harassment worse, and twenty-five percent of male employees and
thirty-two percent of female employees believed that it made no difference); Shereen G. Bingham &
Lisa L. Scherer, Factors Associated with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction with
Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 248 (1993) (observing that knowledge about effect of confrontation of
harassers by victims is limited, but some research suggests that such confrontations can be helpful);
Cochran et al., supra note 196, at 224 (reporting that victims who confronted sexual harassers
experienced greater satisfaction); see also, e.g., Krieger, supra note 6, at 190 (showing that fifty to sixty
percent of harassed women found confrontation effective).
222. Frazier, supra note 187, at *6. Interestingly, Dr. Frazier posed the important question of why
we prioritize reporting the harassment rather than facilitating the conversations between the person
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Regarding employees who threatened the harasser that they would tell others
about his harassment, one workplace study showed that many employees found
this response to affect beneficially the sexual harassment itself.223 One review of
the literature showed that “confronting [the harasser] is rated more effective
than other strategies, but it only seems to be effective about half of the time.”224
The research, however, is scant as to whether such “assertive” responses
decrease or increase harms other than the actual sexual harassment.225 A few
studies do show that “assertive” responses increase job harm and emotional
harm. One study found that “women who used aggressive communication
strategies, such as using threats to get the person to stop, were less satisfied with
the outcome of the situation than those who used less aggressive strategies.”226
Some of the reasons for finding the confrontation action ineffective or not
satisfying may be related to the resulting retaliation on the job that resulted from
the confrontation.227 This retaliation included such job harm as lower
performance evaluations, nonpromotion, reassignment, and termination.228
Women who were sexually harassed also used negotiation, which included
efforts to make the harasser stop without involving the employer.229 Knapp’s
research showed that these responses, which she categorized as
“confrontation/negotiation” behaviors,230 were “associated with greater

being harassed and the harasser if the goal was true deterrence. Id. She partially answered her own
question by stating that reporting may provide some punishment value, though punishment not one of
the rationales provided by the Supreme Court in articulating the affirmative defense. Id.; see also
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (describing policies behind affirmative
defense); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (same).
223. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 12, at 31 (indicating that
fifty-five percent of male employees and thirty-seven percent of female employees subjected to sexual
harassment found that threatening to tell or telling others about harassment beneficially affected
sexual harassment, no male employees and fourteen percent of female employees found such action to
make sexual harassment worse, and forty-six percent of male employees and forty-nine percent of
female employees found such action to have no effect on sexual harassment).
224. Frazier, supra note 187, at *5.
225. See, e.g., Bingham & Scherer, supra note 221, at 263 (citing difficulty in drawing conclusions
about effect of aggressive responses to sexual harassment).
226. Frazier, supra note 187, at *5 (citing Bingham & Scherer, supra note 221, at 263-65).
227. Id.
228. Id. at *6 (citing Loy & Stewart, supra note 187, at 40) (finding that of those who were
harassed and confronted their harassers, twelve percent received lower performance evaluations,
seven percent were not promoted, five percent were terminated, and two percent were reassigned); see
also Krieger, supra note 6, at 190-91 (identifying that more recent studies have yielded similar results.
229. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120; see also Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 689 (stating
that negotiation may include direct requests for harasser to stop behavior (citing Gruber, supra note
208, at 3)); Wasti & Cortina, supra note 178, at 402 (noting that in studying responses to sexual
harassment reported by Turkish, Hispanic American, and Anglo American working women,
researchers found that Turkish women relied on negotiation more than Anglo American women,
working class women relied more on negotiation than professional women when harasser was of a
high status, and all women relied increasingly on negotiation responses as harassment incidences
increased).
230. Knapp’s research showed that these responses focus on the harasser and involve little
outside support. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 692.
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emotional distress,”231 even though they seemed to be effective in ending the
behavior.232 Unfortunately, the Knapp research was silent as to the tangible and
intangible employment-related harms associated with “confrontation/
negotiation” behaviors. Therefore, although the research is limited, taking the
research as a whole, it appears that “assertive” responses are mixed in their
success of harm avoidance. Although “assertive” responses can be effective in
decreasing the sexual harassment, that impact must be weighed against the fact
that such responses increase the tangible job harm through retaliation and
increase the emotional distress.
Women also attempt to avoid harm by seeking social and family support in
an effort to cope with the sexual harassment.233 Knapp stated that these
responses were not effective in stopping the harassment, “although [they] may
assist the target in managing the psychological and somatic outcomes associated
with the event and may provide him or her with suggestions for more effective
coping.”234 In addition, seeking medical or emotional counseling was included in
this category of responses, and although it was not necessarily effective in ending
the harassment, “counseling may assist the individual in diffusing the event and
finding more effective solutions to the problem.”235 Therefore, although the
research is again limited, it indicates that seeking social and family support has
no impact on the sexual harassment but helps to avoid the psychological,
emotional, and physical harms of sexual harassment.236 The research is silent as
to the effect of these coping mechanisms in avoiding or mitigating tangible or
intangible employment harm, although such support seeking may result in the
employee’s learning of new harm avoidance mechanisms. And, as seen above in
the discussion of Chamallas’s theory, a decrease in emotional harm should
benefit employment performance and productivity.237
231. Id. (citing Joy A. Livingston, Responses to Sexual Harassment on the Job: Legal,
Organizational, and Individual Actions, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 5, 13 (1982)).
232. Id.
233. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120-21 (citing IS IT A PROBLEM?, supra note 36, at 69)
(finding that sixty-eight percent of study respondents talked with colleagues about sexual harassment
and sixty percent talked with friends and family members); see also Knapp et al., supra note 35, at 689
(recognizing practice of “using sympathetic others to express anger and provide emotional support”
(citing Gruber, supra note 208, at 3)); Wasti & Cortina, supra note 178, at 402 (noting that Turkish,
Hispanic American, and Anglo American women relied on friends, family, and coworkers on a
relatively equal basis, except that professional women relied increasingly on social support as
harassment incidences increased). Social coping responses, which include self-focused strategies that
seek outsider support, may rely on ensuring that others are present when the harasser is present or
discussing harassment with others who are sympathetic, such as peers, coworkers, friends, and family.
Id. at 692. In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 32.9% of employees to some extent talked to family
about the situation; 49.2% of employees to some extent talked to their coworkers about the situation;
47.8% of employees to some extent talked to their friends about the situation; and 7.7% of employees
to some extent talked to a chaplain or counselor about the situation. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note
30, at 1177, 1181, 1185, 1189.
234. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 692.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chamallas’s theory.
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In sum, the research shows that while there are multiple externally focused
harm avoidance mechanisms, not one particular mechanism can help the
employee to avoid all the harms of sexual harassment. Rather, what emerges
from the research is that each mechanism, based on the context, may result in
both increasing and decreasing different harms.
3. Internally Focused Harm Avoidance Mechanisms Documented in the
Social Science Literature
Women who are sexually harassed also utilize internal coping mechanisms
to regulate and manage cognitive and emotional harms resulting from the sexual
harassment.238 These responses focus on an individual’s personal management of
cognitive and emotional reactions.239 Prior to Dr. Fitzgerald’s work in this area,
researchers commonly mislabeled the employee as being “passive”240 in part
because the internally focused responses were not visible to outsiders.241
One internally focused strategy used in response to sexual harassment is
endurance, which is tolerating the harassment because it is unavoidable, one
knows of no other option, or one is afraid.242 Previous research mistakenly
labeled this as a lack of response because endurance would often be externally
manifested as “ignore[ing] the situation” or “doing nothing.”243 In addition,
women subjected to sexual harassment employ thought avoidance as a coping
strategy, which includes ignoring thoughts about the harassment.244 Other coping
mechanisms include denial, which is deliberately deciding to “ignore the
situation, to pretend it is not happening, or that one does not care”;245

238. Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 572.
239. Id.
240. Yoder & Aniakudo, supra note 178, at 126-27 (citing, inter alia, Gruber & Bjorn, supra note
209, at 819; Reilly, Lott & Gallogly, supra note 218, at 346; Sandra S. Tangri, Martha R. Burt &
Leanor B. Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 4748 (1982); AN UPDATE, supra note 36, at 24).
241. Krieger, supra note 6, at 181-82 (describing how internally focused strategies to cope with
sexual harassment were previously inaccurately categorized as passive responses).
242. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120. In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 64.3% of
employees tolerated the harassment to some extent. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 30, at 1201.
243. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120.
244. Id. Avoidance has been defined as a “passive” response that may include behavior such as
ignoring the sexual harassment or doing nothing. Knapp et al., supra note 36, at 689 (indicating that
Gruber’s “avoidance” response category included “most passive responses,” such as ignoring harasser
or doing nothing (citing Gruber, supra note 208, at 3)). As noted in the DSM-IV, those employees
suffering from PTSD, a harm that may result from sexual harassment, will attempt to “avoid thoughts,
feelings, or conversations about the traumatic event . . . and to avoid activities, situations, or people
who arouse recollections of it.” DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra note 143, at 424-25. In
the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 72.4% of employees tried to forget about the harassment to some
extent and 65.8% of employees to some extent told themselves it was not important. GREENLEES ET
AL., supra note 30, at 1161, 1173.
245. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120. In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey, 43.1% of
employees to some extent pretended not to notice the harassment. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 30,
at 1221.
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detachment;246 self-blame,247 or believing one has illusory control over the
situation;248 and reattribution, such as reinterpreting the situation in order to
make it not able to be categorized as harassment249 or empathizing with the
harasser.250
The research indicates that these internal coping mechanisms are helpful in
eliminating some of the emotional and psychological harm in the short run.251
The research also indicates that whether these strategies are effective in avoiding
emotional and psychological harm in the long run depends on the individual
person.252 Unfortunately, the research is again silent as to the effect of these
internal coping mechanisms on other forms of harm, though one would
anticipate they do not decrease sexual harassment. There may be a possibility
that such internally focused strategies could decrease job harm because, as
Chamallas states, there is an interconnection between psychological harm and
job harm.253
4.

Lena’s Harm Avoidance Responses

Returning to Lena’s situation, after considering the social psychology
research, the workplace studies, and the policy behind the avoidable
consequences doctrine, a more complete picture of Lena—the harms she has
suffered and the actions she took to avoid harm—emerges for the liability
determination. Perhaps most importantly, by considering all of Lena’s externally
and internally focused actions, Lena clearly appears as an actor—she is
responding to the sexual harassment, she is harm avoiding, she is not passive.
Her actions are many.
Lena employed a variety of externally focused coping mechanisms to avoid
harm. She physically avoided Dave by calling in sick frequently, avoiding
overtime work, and asking that her meetings with Dave be in her cubicle rather
than in his closed office. Lena also appeased Dave by trying to deter him without
246. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120 (stating that very little research has been conducted on
prevalence of detachment as coping strategy by women who are sexually harassed).
247. GREENLEES ET AL., supra note 30, at 1209 (finding that in 2002 Armed Forces Survey,
fifteen percent of employees to some extent blamed themselves for what was happening).
248. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 120 (citing study that found that twenty-five percent of
female victims attributed harassment in some way to their own behavior (citing Inger W. Jensen &
Barbara A. Gutek, Attributions and Assignment of Responsibility in Sexual Harassment, 38 J. SOC.
ISSUES 121, 127 (1982))). Other than the Jensen and Gutek study, little else is known about the
prevalence of illusory control in sexual harassment victims. Id.
249. Id. (citing Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 209, at 286). In the 2002 Armed Forces Survey,
thirty-four percent of employees to some extent assumed the harasser meant well. GREENLEES ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 1213.
250. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 119-20 (stating that, similar to research regarding
detachment and illusory control, research on reattribution needs to be studied further to understand
its rate of utilization by women who are sexually harassed).
251. Fitzgerald & Ormerod, supra note 125, at 572.
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chamallas’s theory on
how psychological stress and job harm are related.
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conflict when she moved her body away from him and by standing up to leave a
meeting with a false, work-related excuse. Lena also informally complained to
Victor. She then stopped giving Victor information once he humiliated her. Lena
sought social support by telling Karen, her best friend, about Dave’s sexual
harassment of her and how it made her feel. Lena also used the internally
focused mechanism of reattributing Dave’s sexual harassment of her as
accidental or resulting from Dave’s personality as a “touchy” person. Finally,
Lena endured the harassment and did not formally complain in order to lessen
further humiliation and avoid ostracism and possible retaliation.
According to Knapp’s research and other studies, Lena’s externally focused
appeasement and avoidance behaviors could be effective at stopping the sexual
harassment but may impair Lena’s ability to perform her work.254 Unfortunately,
the research is silent as to how avoidance actions impact emotional and
psychological harms.255 Knapp’s research also indicates that while Lena’s
discussions with Karen are not effective at ending the sexual harassment, they
may be effective in managing her resulting emotional and psychological harm.256
Regarding Lena’s informal complaint to Victor, the informal organizational
structure impacted the effectiveness of her complaint.257 Victor responded with a
joke and did not follow up in any way. This response resulted in Lena feeling
humiliated and not complaining further. And the sexual harassment continued.
Therefore, in this situation, reporting did not avoid any of her harms. The
research indicates that Lena’s use of reattribution may be helpful in eliminating
some of the emotional and psychological harm as well. Lena’s endurance of the
harassment is an internally focused coping mechanism designed to avoid the
harm of the stress of sexual harassment. The mechanism may vary in its
effectiveness at reducing the harm in the short and long term. Unfortunately, the
research is silent as to the effect of internal coping mechanisms on avoiding other
harms from sexual harassment such as the acts of sexual harassment and
employment-related harms.
Nonetheless, through this discussion, it becomes apparent that broader
notions of avoiding harm will result in a more complete view of Lena and how
she is attempting to mitigate her damages and avoid injury. Such a view permits
a more thorough liability determination under the affirmative defense because
the court can determine more accurately whether Lena is reasonably avoiding
harm, such as sexual harassment, emotional harm, and psychological harm, by
actions other than filing a formal complaint. At the same time, the complexity of
determining whether an employee has reasonably avoided or attempted to avoid
harm becomes clear. Perhaps the most striking example of this complexity is the
254. See supra notes 210, 217 and accompanying text for a discussion of Knapp’s theories on the
effectiveness of avoidance behaviors and the impact on the victim’s job performance.
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effectiveness of
seeking social and family support.
257. See infra notes 304-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts have viewed
alternative or informal methods of “avoiding harm” that are not included in the employer’s sexual
harassment policy.
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research that supports Lena’s experience that complaining about the harassment
increased her emotional harm.258
IV. EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND “AVOIDING HARM OTHERWISE”
As previously stated, in deciding liability for supervisor sexual harassment
cases, the courts to date have focused primarily on the limited questions of
whether the employer had a policy, and, if so, whether the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to use the formal complaint mechanism pursuant to the
policy.259 The courts have also examined whether the employer properly
responded to any employee reporting of sexual harassment.260 In evaluating
whether the employer satisfied the employer-focused prong, the courts have
focused on whether the company had a nonharassment policy and whether the
policy contained an appropriate complaint mechanism.261 In general, despite the
fact that harm avoidance is an animating principle of the affirmative defense,262
the courts have not scrutinized the effectiveness of employer policies in avoiding
harm. Specifically, the courts have not properly scrutinized whether an
employer’s policy was actually effective in getting employees to report sexual
harassment or whether the complaint mechanism effectively deterred sexual
harassment and protected employees from retaliation.263 Such failings show that
258. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of how complaining about
the harassment may result in humiliation, embarrassment, and the attachment of negative stigmas.
259. See Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1285-86 (noting that in study of seventy-two
cases, employer defendants were granted summary judgment in all twenty cases in which employee
failed to complain pursuant to employer harassment policy and employer generally exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment); see, e.g., Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F.
Supp. 2d 980, 993 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to report
harassment pursuant to employer’s plan); Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A.
700CV145-R, 2001 WL 1012803, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (denying summary judgment because
plaintiff reported harassment pursuant to employer’s plan).
260. See Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1281, 1292 (showing that if employee properly
complained, courts also have examined whether employer responded appropriately to complaint, such
as by conducting an investigation or changing environment to control harassment, and whether
employee reasonably participated in investigation process). Such actions relate to the employer
prong’s requirement that the “employer exercise[] reasonable care to . . . correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
261. E.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that “the existence [of sexual
harassment policy] militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that the employer ‘exercised reasonable
care to prevent’ and promptly correct sexual harassment” (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807)); see also
Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 11 (“Courts have been strict with employers who
do not meet this basic requirement of having a policy specifically dealing with sexual harassment, but
have been flexible in approving different types of policies.”).
262. See supra Part I for a discussion of affirmative defenses to sexual harassment.
263. See, e.g., Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that distribution of acceptable policy equates to convincing proof of sufficient prevention that
can be rebutted only by evidence that “‘employer adopted or administered [a policy] in bad faith or
that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional’” (quoting Brown, 184 F.3d at 396)); see also
Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that company’s distribution of
acceptable policy often satisfies first prong of affirmative defense).
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“file cabinet compliance,”264 having a policy regardless of its effectiveness, is
credited to the employer even though it is not necessarily related to decreasing
sexual harassment or otherwise avoiding the harms of sexual harassment.265
The focus of this Part is to examine the case doctrine regarding the
employee-focused prong of the affirmative defense and how such doctrine meets
or fails to meet the driving rationale of avoiding harm. Since the Supreme Court
first articulated the employer’s affirmative defense to hostile work environment
sexual harassment, the courts have failed to analyze all of the types of harm
experienced by women employees subjected to supervisor sexual harassment.
Similarly, the courts have failed to acknowledge fully all of the strategies such
employees use to avoid those harms. As a result, because courts have judged
employees’ responses almost exclusively based on whether employees reported
the sexual harassment,266 and because few employees actually do so,267 the courts
have regularly found no employer liability due to the employers’ satisfaction of
the employee-focused prong.268 One study showed that between June 1998 and
January 2000, courts dismissed approximately seventy percent of supervisor
sexual harassment cases based on defendants’ ability to prevail on the
affirmative defense.269 Such a limited analysis of harms and harm avoidance is
inconsistent with the affirmative defense and the policy behind it and Title VII.
This Part analyzes the body of case law regarding the employee-focused prong
and concludes that the courts are almost consistently failing to properly credit
employees with all of their harm avoidance actions and thus are not properly
determining liability for supervisor sexual harassment.
A.

“Avoid Harm Otherwise” Analysis Absent from Court Decisions

Regarding the employee-focused prong of the affirmative defense, many
courts simply fail to consider whether the employee “avoided harm otherwise”

264. Lawton, supra note 6, at 198.
265. Id.
266. See supra note 263 and accompanying text for examples of how courts almost exclusively
look to whether employees reported the harassment instead of using other avoidance mechanisms.
267. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of research indicating that
sexually harassed victims are unlikely to file a formal complaint.
268. See Shaw, 180 F.3d at 812-13 (finding affirmative defense to protect employer when
harassment policy complaint procedure was not used by employee even though employee claimed to
have never seen policy); Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 993 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (finding
no liability for employer, as employer exerted reasonable care and employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of complaint filing procedure).
269. Marks, supra note 6, at 1453-54; Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1280-81; see also
Chamallas, supra note 13, at 325 (stating that numerous courts have ruled in favor of employers on
summary judgment since affirmative defense was created); Grossman, The First Bite, supra note 6, at
708-15 (stating that many trial courts do not examine facts to determine if employee complaint prior to
harassment could have prevented harassment—instead they simply assume hostile work environment
exists and look to see whether employer has sufficient evidence to prevail on affirmative defense). But
see Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
548, 591 (2001) (explaining that prior to affirmative defense, plaintiffs who did not report harassment
lost majority of time).
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when analyzing the affirmative defense. This failure is a result of either
conflating the two components of the employee-focused prong into one
component or truncating the prong to exclude the “avoid harm otherwise”
component altogether. For example, some courts simply delete the “avoid harm
otherwise” component from the affirmative defense and state that the employer
need show only that plaintiff failed to utilize the employer’s preventative or
corrective opportunities.270 More often, the courts recognize that the avoid harm
otherwise component is a part of the rule but then fail to analyze it. These courts
then conflate the two components of the employee-focused prong into the single
analysis of whether the employee complained pursuant to the company’s policy
and cooperated in any subsequent investigation.271
One case exemplifying this conflation is Lane v. State of Oregon Department
of Corrections.272 In this case, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary
judgment stating that there was a dispute of facts as to the reasonableness of the
employee’s failure to timely initiate a report of her supervisor’s sexual
harassment.273 The court found that because the supervisor had threatened that
more harm would result if she complained and because the supervisor was
respected and seen as a father-figure by other employees, a fact finder could
decide it was not unreasonable for the employee to not timely complain.274
In denying the summary judgment motion, the court did not conduct any
analysis of the “avoid harm otherwise” component, though there were many
facts relevant to this analysis. For instance, the record showed that the employee,
Lane, took specific actions in response to the sexual harassment in an attempt to
mitigate her resulting harms. In order to mitigate possible job loss, Lane did not
timely report the sexual harassment. She was a trial employee and feared
termination because she was actually told by her supervisor that everyone would
believe him and not her if she were to complain.275 In addition, Lane stated that
she did not file a complaint initially because “those in the chain of command
were ‘tight,’ and she did not want the humiliation and embarrassment associated

270. See, e.g., Olson v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 130 Fed. App’x 380, 389-90 (11th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that second prong of affirmative defense is met where employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of employer’s preventative and corrective opportunities); Newman v. Coll. of
Mainland, No. G-05-667, 2006 WL 3391445, at *5 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2006) (finding that defendant
did not meet burden of demonstrating that plaintiff failed to “take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities”); MacKenzie v. Potter, No. 04-C-4070, 2006 WL 1005127, at *7, *9 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 14, 2006) (correctly stating rule initially, but in actual analysis of employee-focused prong, failing
to identify “avoid harm otherwise” component).
271. See, e.g., Jernigan v. Alderwoods Group, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1197 (D. Or. 2007)
(misstating prong as requiring employer-defendant to show that plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided [by the employer] to avoid harm”).
Following the courts’ lead, scholars often conflate the two components of the employee-focused prong
as well. See, e.g., Sherwyn, Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1290 (finding employee’s failure to report is
“tantamount to per se ‘unreasonable’ behavior” under employee-focused prong).
272. 2006 WL 3762104, No. G-05-1497-AA, at *6 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2006).
273. Id. at *7.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *4.
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with filing a complaint of sexual harassment.”276 Therefore, in not initially filing
her complaint, Lane was managing the effect of reporting the harassment on two
different harms—Lane was attempting to balance the increased emotional harms
that would result from the filing with the potential that reporting might decrease
the incidence of the sexual harassment itself. Lane also avoided her emotional
harm and the sexual harassment when she made up “excuses so that ‘[the
supervisor] would get the hint and not continue.’ For example, when [the
supervisor] asked Lane if she ‘was ever going to meet him,’ Lane told [him]
directly that she would not because of his wife, after which they rarely spoke.”277
This action by Lane is a great example of the use of the external coping
mechanism of assertion in order to manage the stressor—the harm—of sexual
harassment.278 Moreover, based on the court’s recounting of the supervisor’s
response to Lane’s avoidance behavior, her behavior actually succeeded in
stopping his sexual advances.279 Accordingly, Lane took multiple harm
avoidance actions. Nonetheless, the court did not use these harm avoidance
actions as part of its affirmative defense analysis under the “avoid harm
otherwise” component. Rather, the court only focused on the reasonableness of
her failure to initiate a complaint, and that determination did not adequately
acknowledge Lane’s full range of harms other than sexual harassment and her
multiple harm avoidance actions other than reporting the harassment.
Returning to Lena and her situation, despite her multiple harms and harm
avoidance actions discussed above, a court, following the trend in Lane and
other court decisions, would inappropriately omit any “avoid harm otherwise”
analysis in determining liability. Lena’s employer would most likely prevail on
the affirmative defense and avoid liability by concentrating on the employerfocused prong and the first component of the employee-focused prong.
Specifically, the employer would show that it had a policy and that Lena
“unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive and corrective
opportunities” by failing to file a formal complaint under the policy.280 The
employer and the court would either ignore the second component of the
employee-focused prong altogether or conflate it with the first component.281 As
a result, they would pay no attention to Lena’s other actions that were taken to
avoid harm, including those harms other than sexual harassment. Lena might
argue that it was not “unreasonable” for her to fail to complain because of
Victor’s response to her informal complaint.282 To date, such arguments, by and

276. Id. at *6.
277. Lane, 2006 WL 3762104, at *6 (citation omitted).
278. See supra notes 178-84, 206-11, 218-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of employee
coping mechanisms.
279. Lane, 2006 WL 3762104, at *6 (explaining that Lane’s supervisor rarely spoke to her after
she told him she would not “meet” him because he was married).
280. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
281. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for a discussion of limited applications of the
second prong.
282. A very common analysis under the employee-focused prong is whether any delay by
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large, have been unsuccessful.283 Lena might also argue that her failure to
complain was not “unreasonable” given her other actions to try to avoid the
harm, such as moving away from Dave when he touched her inappropriately,
avoiding Dave at work, trying to defuse the situation, and discussing her problem
and the emotional toll on her with Karen.284 Such arguments are becoming a bit
more frequent in courts and courts have responded to these arguments with
mixed success. At times, courts recognize that such actions may be a reasonable
justification for employees’ delay in reporting, but usually courts do not credit
the employees with avoiding their harm.285
As a result, despite the affirmative defense’s inclusion of the word
“otherwise” to indicate that availing oneself of the employer’s formal
mechanisms might be one of many ways to avoid harm,286 in Lena’s case a
narrow liability interpretation by the court most likely would only examine
whether Lena complained pursuant to the employer’s policy.287 This narrow

plaintiff in reporting the sexual harassment was “reasonable.” See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339
F.3d 1158, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff’s hesitation in complaining to employer was
unreasonable); Hardy v. Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 328 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that second
prong was not satisfied because employer could not demonstrate that plaintiff’s delay in filing
complaint was unreasonable); Payano v. Fordham Tremont CMHC, 287 F. Supp. 2d 470, 477
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that, despite plaintiff’s fear, his failure to complain pursuant to policy was
unreasonable); see also Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 21-23 (discussing
reasonableness of plaintiff’s failure to complain).
283. See, e.g., Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1178-79 (finding plaintiff’s failure to complain third time was
unreasonable, despite her discomfort and dissatisfaction with how employer handled situation on
previous occasions). But see Lane v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., No. G-05-1497-AA, 2006 WL 3762104, at *7
(D. Or. Dec. 18, 2006) (recognizing outstanding factual issue as to whether employee’s failure to
initiate a timely complaint was unreasonable under circumstances).
284. See supra Parts II and III.B.4 for a discussion of Lena’s harm avoidance actions based on
the social science research regarding coping mechanisms for the stressors of sexual harassment.
285. See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Potter, No. 04-C-4070, 2006 WL 1005127, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14,
2006) (finding plaintiff’s attempts to ignore and personally remedy harassing behavior could not
explain unreasonably long wait to file formal complaint, which denied employer chance to remedy
situation). Clearly in Mackenzie, the plaintiff was employing harm avoidance mechanisms. Because the
court failed to conduct an “avoid harm otherwise” analysis, the court did not credit plaintiff with any
of her actions. See Mackenzie, 2006 WL 1005127, at *9 (finding that plaintiff unreasonably failed to
take advantage of employer’s corrective procedure due to seven-month delay in reporting). The
court’s failure could be attributed to its incorrect reliance on notice to employer, rather than harm
avoidance, as the policy rationale underlying the affirmative defense and liability determinations. See
infra Part V.B for a discussion of how the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative
defense should be discussed and analyzed in liability determinations of supervisor sexual harassment
cases.
286. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). But see Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 3 (suggesting that
sexual harassment policies are not necessarily effective in deterring, preventing, or correcting sexual
harassment).
287. In fact, one study shows that courts fail to consider any employee-related conduct, save for
whether she filed a formal complaint of sexual harassment, in analyzing the employee-focused prong
of the entire affirmative defense. Sherwyn, Heise, & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1285-86. This study shows
that as long as the employer had an adequate policy and an adequate response to workplace sexual
harassment, the employer would prevail on both prongs of the affirmative defense. Id. at 1286.
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interpretation is consistent with many court decisions.288 There would likely be
no focus on the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative defense.
As a result of its lack of attention to the second component, the court would fail
in basing its liability decision on the affirmative defense’s animating principle of
harm avoidance.
An even larger problem created by such an analysis is that the court would
be constructing Lena as a nonactor because she failed to report the sexual
harassment formally. Because we know that women employees do not complain
but do take many other steps in response to sexual harassment,289 the court’s
focus on formal reporting alone necessarily focuses on an absence of action by
the employee. Yet, women are taking other important mitigating actions to avoid
harm, as discussed above.290 Until courts properly analyze the “avoid harm
otherwise” component of the affirmative defense and consider all harm
avoidance actions,291 courts will inaccurately construct women employees, such
as Lena, as nonactors and make incorrect liability determinations.
B.

“Avoid Harm Otherwise” Analysis Present, but Limited

Unlike the above-discussed cases, there are other cases in which courts
actually have analyzed the “avoid harm otherwise” component or at least based
its liability decision in part on actual harm avoidance. In those cases, however,
the courts have too narrowly construed “harm” and “avoidance of harm.”292 As
a result, the courts fail to address comprehensively an employee’s mitigation of
all of her damages resulting from sexual harassment. Such a failure is usually due

288. Id. at 1286; see also, e.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1292
(11th Cir. 2003) (stating that employee avoids harm by filing complaint). See also supra note 28-29 and
accompanying text for a discussion of employees’ typical responses to sexual harassment.
289. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of externally focused harm avoidance mechanisms.
290. Id.
291. See supra Part III.B.4 for a discussion of Lena’s harm avoidance responses.
292. See Walton, 347 F.3d at 1289-91 (concluding that plaintiff’s fear of retaliation was not
sufficient justification for her failure to report and “avoid harm otherwise”); Mays v. City Sch. Bd., 5 F.
App’x 181, 182 n.2 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that plaintiff’s claim failed because, inter alia, she did not
avoid contact with alleged harasser after supervisor instructed her to do so); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d
388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff failed to “avoid harm otherwise” when she failed to
avoid harasser, despite her formal complaint); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999)
(considering only corrective mechanisms designed to stop sexual harassment in “avoid harm
otherwise” analysis); Cromer-Kendall v. District of Columbia, 326 F. Supp. 2d 50, 64 (D.D.C. 2004)
(holding that plaintiff defeated affirmative defense by reporting harassment, and thus defendant failed
to show that plaintiff did not “avoid harm otherwise”); Rodriguez v. City of Houston, 250 F. Supp. 2d
691, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that “avoid harm otherwise” component does not require plaintiff
to vacate her job position that subjects her to daily contact with harasser); Taylor v. United Reg’l
Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL 1012803, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001)
(defining “avoid harm otherwise” as requiring employee to provide notice of sexual harassment to
employer); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1178 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (finding “avoid harm
otherwise” to be jury question where woman complained about sexual harassment to friend, who was
also manager in company); Green v. Servicemaster Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013-14 (N.D. Iowa 1999)
(denying employer’s summary judgment motion due to factual dispute as to whether plaintiff’s
complaint to union steward was attempt to “avoid harm otherwise”).
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to the courts’ lack of consideration of the broad range of harms and harm
avoidance behaviors rather than a rejection of their relevance to the liability
determination under the affirmative defense. For instance, in Speaks v. City of
Lakeland,293 the court found that the plaintiff failed to use the employer’s
complaint procedure.294 Therefore, the court found that “[m]ost, if not all, of the
harm to Plaintiff could have been avoided by Plaintiff simply reporting [her
supervisor] at the beginning of the harassment.”295 The court did not explore
whether certain harms, such as employment, emotional, or psychological harms,
were mitigated by the plaintiff’s decision to not report. In addition, the court did
not discuss whether the plaintiff took other actions in order to decrease the
harassment itself. Rather, because the plaintiff did not report the harassment,
the court granted summary judgment to the employer because the “[p]laintiff did
not exercise reasonable care to avoid sexual harassment by [the supervisor] or
otherwise avoid harm.”296 Unfortunately, the Speaks court is not alone in merely
providing lip service to the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative
defense and thereby failing to analyze fully all the harms and harm avoidance
actions taken by the employee.
Regarding the concept of “harm,” courts have almost uniformly failed to
pay attention to the diversity of harms suffered by victims of sexual harassment.
To the extent that courts are looking to whether a plaintiff mitigated “harm,” the
majority of courts have employed an inappropriately narrow construction to
include the acts of sexual harassment only.297 In a couple of cases, courts have
acknowledged that one of the harms resulting from sexual harassment is ongoing
contact with the harassing supervisor.298 Several courts have also recognized that
psychological trauma is a harm resulting from sexual harassment.299 One case
even cited to plaintiff’s lack of employment as a harm.300 Yet on the rare
293. 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
294. Speaks, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (equating “harm” to sexual
harassment); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) (failing to define “harm” explicitly
but implicitly equating “harm” to sexual harassment); Duhé v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. Civ.A. 03-746,
2004 WL 439890, at *16 (E.D. La. Mar. 9, 2004) (equating harm to actionable hostile work
environment); Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL
1012803, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (equating “harm” to sexual harassment); Green v.
Servicemaster Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013-14 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (reading “harm” as synonymous
with sexual harassment).
298. Cf. Rodriguez v. City of Houston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 691, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (recognizing
implicitly harm that results from continued contact with supervisor but finding that employee need not
leave job to “avoid harm”).
299. See Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1289-91 (11th Cir. 2003)
(recognizing that severe sexual harassment “can be particularly traumatic”); Reed v. MBNA Mktg.
Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) (recognizing that reporting sexual harassment is scary,
uncomfortable, and painful); see also Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1307
(11th Cir. 2007) (citing Walton and Reed for proposition that reporting sexual harassment can be
extremely unpleasant).
300. Mueller v. McGrath Lexus of Chi., No. 02 C0021, 2003 WL 21688230, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 17,
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occasions when the courts have recognized broader harms, the courts usually fail
to credit the plaintiff with having attempted to balance her harms by taking
action that might decrease some harms while not affecting or increasing other
harms. This failure is especially true if the plaintiff has chosen an action that may
decrease her emotional harm but results in her failure to report the sexual
harassment.301
Similarly, on the all too rare occasions when the courts have actually paid
attention to the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative defense,
they have also too narrowly determined which actions to credit as harm
avoiding.302 Such limitations are most likely due to the fact that the majority of
courts, as discussed above, have analyzed only a limited universe of harms to be
avoided.303
To the extent that “avoiding harm” has been discussed, most courts have
acknowledged only a plaintiff’s reporting of the sexual harassment to her
employer pursuant to the official policy against sexual harassment as “avoiding
harm.”304 At times, the courts have recognized other reporting actions as

2003).
301. Walton, 347 F.3d at 1290 (holding that even though reporting sexual harassment can be
traumatic, employer will not be held liable because plaintiff’s failure to report precluded employer
from being able to correct sexual harassment); Reed, 333 F.3d at 35 (noting that employee’s “painful
effort” of reporting sexual harassment is necessary to impose liability on employer); see also Brown,
184 F.3d at 390-91, 397 (finding that plaintiff failed to avoid harm even though she reported
harassment because plaintiff, in order to protect her employment, did not avoid harasser); Chamallas,
supra note 13, at 384-85 (discussing courts’ tendency to undervalue emotional harm by not seeing it as
related to economic harm and also job-related injury).
302. It should be noted that many courts explicitly or implicitly have recognized that the
employer cannot satisfy the employee-focused prong if the employee had availed herself of either the
employer-provided preventive or corrective mechanisms or avoided harm otherwise. See, e.g., Watts v.
Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that either employer complaint or union
complaint can satisfy employee-focused prong). Such a decision is logical because the affirmative
defense language clearly requires the employer to prove that plaintiff both failed to use the complaint
mechanism and to avoid harm otherwise. There is one case, however, that held that an employer
satisfied the employee-focused prong because the employee had only availed herself of the policy and
had not avoided harm otherwise. Brown, 184 F.3d at 397 (holding that “or” in employee-focused
prong requires employer to prove only one of two components in prong; therefore, despite fact that
plaintiff had complained pursuant to policy, because she socialized with her supervisor and was
sexually harassed again by him, she had failed to avoid harm and no liability would attach). Another
case decided that whether a plaintiff “avoided harm otherwise” is only relevant to the liability
determination under the affirmative defense if it justified the employee’s failure to report the sexual
harassment. Williams v. Multnomah Educ. Serv. Dist., No. CIV. 97-1197-ST, 1999 WL 454633, at *10
(D. Or. Apr. 14, 1999). The Brown and Williams cases are rightly outliers given the animating policy
behind the affirmative defense of avoiding harm.
303. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the broad range of harms that can result from sexual
harassment.
304. See, e.g., Duhé v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. Civ.A. 03-746, 2004 WL 439890, at *16 (E.D. La.
Mar. 9, 2004) (“If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer’s preventive or
remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages that could have been avoided if she had done
so.”). As noted infra Part V.B, equating the reporting of sexual harassment with avoidance of harm is
ironic considering that social science research has shown that employer policies, complainant
reporting, and employer investigations do not necessarily reduce sexual harassment. Grossman,

2007]

“AVOIDING HARM OTHERWISE”

795

“avoiding harm otherwise” if they provided some form of notice to the
employer.305 For instance, a few courts have found that even though plaintiff’s
reporting did not technically comply with the employer’s policy because plaintiff
complained to a manager not identified in the employer’s sexual harassment
policy, plaintiff’s actions “avoided harm otherwise” because they notified the
employer of the harassment.306 Despite interpreting victims’ actions favorably,
this interpretation inappropriately limits the “avoid harm otherwise” component.
As the Supreme Court designed the employee-focused prong to increase harm
avoidance, all forms of harm avoidance, not just notifying the employer, should
be analyzed.307
Other courts have correctly analyzed the “avoiding harm otherwise”
component by recognizing any action that is aimed at avoiding harm. For
instance, courts have recognized that grieving the sexual harassment to one’s
union can constitute “avoiding harm otherwise” because it is a corrective
mechanism aimed at avoiding the harm of harassment.308 Some courts also have
acknowledged, on occasion, plaintiff’s actions to avoid the harassing supervisor
himself as relevant to the “avoid harm otherwise” component.309 One court
identified that whether a plaintiff stayed in or quit her job was relevant to
“avoiding harm otherwise.”310 Nevertheless, the courts’ analyses are incomplete
because they primarily recognize harm avoidance actions only for their effect on
sexual harassment and not on any other harms.

Culture of Compliance, supra note 6, at 3.
305. See Fields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 03-cv-4222-JPG, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15 (S.D. Ill. Sept.
12, 2006) (finding that employee’s technical compliance with policy that permitted reports to EEOC or
employer still constituted unreasonable failure to make use of policy in way that would provide
employer with notice); EEOC v. V & J Foods, Inc., No. 05-C-194, 2006 WL 3203713, at *7-8 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 3, 2006), rev’d, 507 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2007) (requiring employee to provide notice to
employer to meet employee affirmative defense). But see infra Part V.B for a discussion and critique
of the notice requirement.
306. See, e.g., Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL
1012803, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (applying test where actions to “avoid harm” entail notifying
management of harassment, including notifying managers outside of formal complaint mechanism);
Cherry v. Menard, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1178 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (concluding that actions to “avoid
harm” may include complaining to manager not identified in formal complaint mechanism, even if
manager is friend).
307. See supra Part I for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s employee-focused prong as
articulated in Faragher and Ellerth.
308. See, e.g., Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that actions to
“avoid harm” include filing union grievance); Green v. Servicemaster Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013-14
(N.D. Iowa 1999) (finding that filing union grievance can be avoiding harm otherwise).
309. E.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that plaintiff failed to
“avoid harm” because she socialized with supervisor); Rodriguez v. City of Houston, 250 F. Supp. 2d
691, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that plaintiff need not vacate her job position that subjects her to
daily contact with harasser in order to “avoid harm” effectively).
310. Mueller v. McGrath Lexus of Chi., No. 02 C 0021, 2003 WL 21688230, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July
17, 2003) (holding that plaintiff’s quitting of her job despite fact that sexual harassment had ceased was
failure to avoid harm).
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A good example of the courts’ general failure to analyze fully all harms
when analyzing harm avoidance acts is Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Services,
Inc.311 In Walton, the court correctly identified that there were multiple, relevant
harms resulting from the sexual harassment.312 Specifically, the court recognized
that the sexual harassment was one harm and the psychological trauma was
another.313 Nonetheless, the court only credited as “harm avoidance” actions
taken by the plaintiff those actions it determined would have eradicated the
sexual harassment.314 As a result, the court dismissed the relevance of plaintiff’s
psychological trauma being exacerbated as a result of reporting the
harassment.315 This court’s narrowing of harm avoidance, though inappropriate,
is not surprising given the multitude of court decisions that fail to properly
recognize all harms and harm avoidance when making liability determinations.
Courts that either ignore an “avoiding harm” analysis altogether or
narrowly construe harm avoidance are incorrectly analyzing the affirmative
defense. As discussed earlier, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton316 and Ellerth v.
Burlington Industries, Inc.,317 the Supreme Court’s analysis made clear that harm
avoidance is the motivating principle for liability determinations for supervisor
sexual harassment.318 Without properly analyzing all of the harms and the ways
in which they are avoided, the courts fail to credit employees with their full range
of harm avoidance.
V.

RECONCEPTUALIZING “AVOID HARM OTHERWISE”

This Part explores how the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the
affirmative defense should be discussed and analyzed in liability determinations
of supervisor sexual harassment cases.
A.

“Avoiding Harm Otherwise”

In order to determine liability, an employer must show that it “exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior” and that the “employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.”319 If the employee utilized the employer’s mechanisms, then
the employer has failed to meet its burden and liability should attach, regardless
of whether she avoided any other harm in any other way. The reason for this

311. 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003).
312. Walton, 347 F.3d at 1290.
313. Id. at 1283.
314. Id. at 1290.
315. Id. at 1290-91.
316. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
317. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
318. See supra notes 51-85 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Faragher and
Ellerth cases.
319. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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result is that the employer has supposedly, in part, created the policy to avoid the
harm of harassment. Therefore, if the employee avails herself of reporting, she
satisfies what the employer thought was necessary to avoid harm.
On the other hand, assuming that the employee unreasonably failed to use
the employer’s process for reporting the sexual harassment, the employer should
still be required to show that plaintiff did not avoid harm otherwise. This inquiry
should explore all of the harms identified by the case law, social science research,
and workplace studies.320 As stated earlier in this Article, these harms should
include the sexual harassment; the stigma of discrimination; the resulting
tangible job harm, such as termination or nonpromotion; the resulting intangible
job harm, such as an abusive work environment and loss of employment
advancement; economic harm; and emotional, psychological, and physical harms.
In response to these harms, women who are sexually harassed utilize a wide
range of strategies to avoid these harms, such as avoiding the harasser, objecting
to the harasser, formally complaining about the sexual harassment, seeking
support from friends and family, and ignoring thoughts about the sexual
harassment and denying that the harassment occurred.321 And of course, because
one harm avoidance strategy may decrease one type of harm while increasing
another, the determination of liability based on “avoid harm otherwise” requires
a court to weigh the various strategies employed and their effectiveness in
mitigating damages in the aggregate, as required by the avoidable consequences
doctrine.322
The support for a robust “avoid harm otherwise” analysis is grounded in the
rationale for the affirmative defense, the avoidable consequences doctrine, and
damages theory. In addition, it is supported by the social science and workplace
studies that document employees’ harms from sexual harassment and their
coping mechanisms to diminish these harms. And because the courts more often
than not have ignored the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the employeefocused prong of the affirmative defense, no body of case law has systematically
defined the contours of this component and its role in liability determinations.
Any cases that have identified competing harms and strategies of harm
avoidance323 have not thoroughly explored the social science research and the
Supreme Court’s reasoning behind the affirmative defense when dismissing the
emotional and other harms that can result from making an official sexual
harassment complaint. As a result, this area has been underexplored.
Employees, employers, lawyers, and courts should begin to analyze all of the
harms resulting from sexual harassment and whether the employee has
attempted to mitigate them.

320. See supra Part III.A for a listing and discussion of the different types of harms.
321. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of harm avoidance mechanisms.
322. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the analyses used in assessing liability when based on
the “avoid harm otherwise” doctrine.
323. E.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003)
(identifying competing harms and strategies of harm avoidance).
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For instance, in Lena’s case, as discussed above, Lena has been subjected to
multiple harms and she has taken multiple actions to avoid harm. Lena has
suffered the sexual harassment of being touched by Dave on her thighs, lower
back, and arms. She has also suffered the intangible job harm of having her
complaint about the sexual harassment be discounted by Victor when he made a
joke of the sexual harassment. In addition, she is worried about being ostracized
at work if she complains to her other coworkers because she thinks they too will
not take it seriously. She is also worried about losing her job if she complains
further. In addition, Lena is suffering other work harm with direct economic
consequences in that she is taking more sick leave than she ever has in the past
and she is not volunteering for, and is even turning down, overtime work. Her
less frequent attendance and willingness to work overtime may also be causing
her supervisors and colleagues to view her as less enthusiastic about her position
or even not a team player. She is also suffering lost joy in her work, she feels
dread about going to work, and she is on edge. These effects constitute the
emotional harms that she is suffering. Finally, she is suffering the physical harms
of loss of appetite and difficulty in sleeping.
As stated above, to deal with these harms, Lena has acted in many different
ways. She employed externally focused coping mechanisms to avoid harm. She
physically avoided Dave by calling in sick, not working overtime, and asking
Dave to meet with her in the cubicle. She also avoided conflict by moving her
body away from Dave to prevent him from being able to touch her rather than
confronting him about his inappropriate touchings. She did complain to Victor,
the acting director of the department when Dave was absent. Although he was
not the official to whom she was supposed to make an official complaint, he was
someone she trusted to reveal the harassment. In addition, Lena sought social
support by talking with Karen about her treatment by Dave and its impact on
Lena’s health and attitude toward work. Lena also reattributed what Dave did to
her as accidental or just informality.
As discussed above, the research shows that Lena’s harm avoidance
mechanisms might be effective in diminishing various harms but might increase
other harms.324 Looking at just one of her behaviors, her avoidance of Dave, the
number of questions that need to be answered becomes apparent. These
questions include: How did the physical moving away from Dave impact the
sexual harassment in frequency, manner, and severity? How did it impact her
emotional harm, such as her feeling on edge? How did it impact her appetite and
sleeping? How, if at all, did it impact her work relationships with coworkers?
When she was able to meet with Dave in her cubicle, was she less inclined to
take sick leave or more likely to take on overtime work? For each harm
avoidance mechanism, similar questions arise that are both fact specific to Lena’s
situation as well as to the larger research findings of the interaction between
harm avoidance actions and harms.
But throughout this process, one thing does become clear. By exploring
these questions, we develop a more complex view of Lena. What emerges is a
324. See supra Part III.B.4 for a discussion of Lena’s harm avoidance mechanisms.
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picture of Lena as an actor, not one who is passive and simply submitting to the
sexual harassment. For this reason alone, and despite the many questions
remaining, there is value in exploring all of Lena’s harms and harm avoidance
actions. By the end of the inquiry, there should be a more reliable understanding
of whether liability should attach to the employer because of Lena’s attempts to
avoid harm as required under the avoidable consequences doctrine.
B. “Avoiding Harm Otherwise” Should Not Always Require Notice to the
Employer
The preceding section discussed this Article’s proposal for crediting an
employee with her harm avoidance actions in determining liability for supervisor
sexual harassment. It is true that, under this harm avoidance proposal, there
might be times in which an employer will be held liable despite having no notice
of the sexual harassment. Such a result is not problematic, as the liability
determination must focus on harm avoidance rather than employer knowledge.
A harm avoidance focus comports with the underlying avoidable consequences
rationale of the affirmative defense and broader liability framework for
supervisor sexual harassment. Accordingly, the focus should be on whether the
action taken was reasonably calculated to avoid the harms from sexual
harassment. Within this analysis, notice to the employer needs to be examined as
to whether it actually avoids harms. As explained below, employer notice does
not necessarily avoid all the harms of sexual harassment and therefore cannot,
without more, be a prerequisite for attaching liability to the employer.325
For many reasons, the assumption that employers who receive reports of
sexual harassment then act to stop the harassment is not necessarily true. For
instance, there have been many studies that show that rather than decreasing
harassment, such reports may instead cause retaliatory adverse treatment of the
complainant.326 In addition, Martha Chamallas has shown that employees who
lodge formal complaints of sexual harassment suffer subsequent work-related

325. Even if there could be agreement that notice to employers about sexual harassment would
decrease harassment in the workplace, it is not clear that employer policies laying out complaint
mechanisms are, or could ever be, effective on their own in providing employer notice. For instance,
Joanna Grossman explains that there is no social science research to support the assumption that
requiring victims of harassment to complain pursuant to company antiharassment policies, without
also grappling with such things as gender balance in the workplace, organizational power, and
treatment of prior complainants, will actually increase the reporting of incidents because the least
likely response to harassment is for an employee to complain. Grossman, Culture of Compliance,
supra note 6, at 23, 52-56; see also Chamallas, supra note 13, at 374 (noting that it is “atypical” for
victims to file internal complaint even when incident is grievous enough to ultimately lead to legal
action). The fact that an employer policy does not always result in increased formal reporting and thus
a deterrence of sexual harassment is not surprising. As David Sherwyn and his coauthors argue, the
requirement that employees provide notice to employers in order to attach liability actually provides
employers with the incentive to create policies hoping no employee will ever use them. Sherwyn,
Heise & Eigen, supra note 6, at 1294.
326. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 375 (citing two different studies showing that large percentage
of employees who complained about sexual harassment—thirty-three percent in one study and sixtyone percent in another—also suffered subsequent retaliation).
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harms because they are often viewed as troublemakers and ostracized by
coworkers.327
Such treatment underscores the reality that it is the workplace’s informal
organization, not its formal organization of reporting and investigation
procedures, that controls the environment and the occurrence of sexual
harassment in the workplace.328 Chamallas explains that the ineffectiveness of
formal grievance procedures is due in part to the fact that such procedures are
created in order to protect employers from liability, not to seek justice for civil
rights violations.329 Specifically, the procedures:
allow the employer to control the process and assure that compliance
does not interfere with the employer’s other more pressing interests.
The decisionmaker is not neutral in the sense of not being accountable
to either side; rather, the person assigned to resolve the dispute is an
employee of the potential defendant who has an interest in minimizing
the extent of the conflict, saving the image of the employer, and
maintaining smooth relationships. His or her main job is to insulate the
employer from legal liability, a goal that may not always coincide with
cutting down on the incidence of sexual harassment.330
Finally, there are other reasons why formal reporting to the employer, and
thus notice itself, does not necessarily decrease the incidence of sexual
harassment. The formalization of the complaint processing has resulted in many
complaint processing officials who may not understand sexual harassment law
and how it fits into the broader civil rights policies and laws.331 As a result, they
receive the complaints and try to problem-solve them as “personality clashes”
rather than view the complaints as part of a pattern of systemic discrimination.332
And the way in which these complaints are processed further isolates complaints
to individual acts of harassment. This isolation results because it is very common
for the employer to require that the harassed employee agree to keep her
harassment confidential as part of the processing of her complaint.333 As a result,
the confidentiality obligation limits the employee’s opportunity to discuss her
harassment with other employees who might be similarly affected and could
otherwise come forward to show a larger pattern of harassment.334 In the end, an
isolated incident of harassment is less likely to be eradicated aggressively or
327. Id. at 376.
328. Id. at 377-78; see also Marshall, supra note 178, at 85-86 (noting critics’ opinions that internal
procedures “are susceptible to the prejudices and power disparities that exist in organizations”). As
Chamallas states, “[w]hether an organization discourages or tolerates harassment may have more to
do with the personal style and commitments of top managers than the formal policies in the employee
handbook.” Chamallas, supra note 13, at 378.
329. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 379.
330. Id. (footnotes omitted).
331. Id. at 379-80.
332. Id. at 379; see also Marshall, supra note 178, at 86, 115-16 (showing that, ultimately,
employees’ rights are reinterpreted from civil rights to management interests).
333. See Chamallas, supra note 13, at 379 (noting that internal grievance procedures often deal
with complaints confidentially).
334. Id.
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disciplined than a pattern of systemic sexual harassment that is impacting the
civil rights of numerous female employees. Because of the culture of formal
complaint processing, notice itself does not necessarily decrease the incidence of
sexual harassment. Accordingly, because there is no definitive correlative
relationship between notice and the deterrence of sexual harassment, Theresa
Beiner questions whether courts should even credit the employer with a defense
to liability when there is a lack of “notice.”335
There are numerous examples in case law as well that show that notice by
itself does not always eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace. For
instance, in Cerros v. Steel Technologies, Inc.,336 despite plaintiff telling the
supervisors and the plant manager about the harassment, the company failed to
correct the harassment or deter future harassment, thus failing to deter the act of
sexual harassment.337
As shown above, notice does not necessarily avoid the harm of sexual
harassment itself. In addition, notice may not have any impact on the mitigation
of the employee’s other harms, such as other employment-related, economic,
emotional, psychological, and physical harms.338 Therefore, notice cannot and
should not monopolize the analysis of the “avoid harm otherwise” component of
the affirmative defense.
Below is a discussion of one court’s flawed reasoning that notice to the
employer of the harassment automatically translates into the cessation of the
harassment and that, therefore, such notice is the only meaningful manner by
which an employee can avoid her harms. In this case, by giving notice primacy,
the court improperly limited the manner by which an employee could
satisfactorily “avoid harm otherwise” because such reasoning ignored other
cognizable harms and appropriate manners to mitigate those harms.339 In Fields
v. Illinois Department of Corrections,340 the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) had a sexual harassment policy that permitted the targeted employee
to report the sexual harassment to the IDOC or to file a complaint with the
EEOC.341 Ms. Gunn, one of the plaintiffs in this case, chose the option that
permitted her to file an EEOC complaint rather than file an internal IDOC
complaint.342 The court stated that under the affirmative defense, “[t]he
requirement that an employee report sexually harassing conduct arises out of her

335. Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6, at 143-44.
336. 398 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2005).
337. Cerros, 398 F.3d at 953-54.
338. See supra notes 325-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of notice on
avoidance of other harms.
339. Fields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 03-cv-4222-JPG, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 12,
2006).
340. No. 03-cv-4222-JPG, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2006).
341. Fields, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15. Specifically, the court found that “the policy urged
employees to use the internal complaint process to obtain a resolution to sexual harassment
complaints, [but] it also allowed an employee to proceed directly to the Illinois Department of Human
Rights or the Equal Employment Opportunity.” Id. at *2.
342. Id. at *15.
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duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm.”343 The court continued that “‘the
law against sexual harassment is not self-enforcing and an employer cannot be
expected to correct harassment unless the employee makes a concerted effort to
inform the employer that a problem exists.’”344 Accordingly, the court
determined that in filing a complaint with the EEOC, rather than reporting the
harassment to the employer, plaintiff had failed to use the employer-provided
measure that would stop the harassment.345
The Fields court’s reasoning is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s duty to avoid
harm.346 The court failed to identify that although the employer’s burden under
the affirmative defense is to attack the sexually harassing behavior, it is the
plaintiff’s job to avoid her harms and that avoidance can be done by following
the employer’s policy, which in fact the plaintiff did do here, or by other actions.
In dismissing Ms. Gunn’s decision to complain to the EEOC rather than the
IDOC, the court stated that plaintiff’s “technical compliance” with the IDOC’s
policy was irrelevant and instead the “question is whether [Gunn] unreasonably
failed to use measures available to her to try to stop the harassment.”347 The
court continued that “[t]he evidence is clear that [Gunn] failed to use those
measures—whether they be an internal complaint or an EEOC charge—in a
timely manner to attempt to give IDOC notice of the harassment and to give it
an opportunity to stop it.”348 The court’s analysis in effect erased the broad
principle of avoiding harm and required instead that the necessary employee
actions for attaching liability to the employer were only those that gave the
employer enough timely information about the ongoing sexual harassment for
the employer to actually stop the harassment.
Beyond inappropriately limiting the range of harm avoidance actions to
notice, the court failed to discuss any harms other than sexual harassment or any
satisfactory harm avoidance actions other than filing a timely report. For
instance, the court did not explore whether the filing of an internal complaint
would have exacerbated plaintiff’s emotional or psychological harm. Nor did the

343. Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998); Cerros v. Steel Tech.,
Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 2005)).
344. Id. (quoting Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998)
(alteration omitted)).
345. Fields, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15.
346. It should be noted that another case, also in the Seventh Circuit, also narrowly construed
harm avoidance. EEOC v. V & J Foods, 2006 WL 3203713, at *7-8 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 3, 2006), rev’d, 507
F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2007). In V & J Foods, the court again required that the plaintiff provide the
employer with notice in order to satisfy the employee-focused prong of the affirmative defense. Id. at
*7. The court based its decision on the fact that the policy rationale to avoid harm is met only if
plaintiff provided the employer “with the knowledge and the means to avoid future harassment.” Id.
at *8. For reasons discussed in this Part, such an interpretation of how harm is to be avoided is far too
narrow. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded on the
grounds that burden was on the defendant employer to demonstrate establishment and
implementation of “an effective complaint machinery.” EEOC v. V & J Foods, Inc., 507 F.3d 575, 580
(7th Cir. 2007).
347. Fields, 2006 WL 2645200, at *15.
348. Id.
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court recognize that Gunn took other forms of harm avoidance actions beyond
her policy-permitted complaint to the EEOC. For instance, Gunn told one of her
supervisors, Parker, that she was offended by his sexual comments about her
anatomy,349 she indicated to another one of her supervisors, Turner, that she did
not appreciate his sexual advances,350 and she filed an IDOC incident report
about Parker’s sexually inappropriate and offensive conduct.351 In addition, in its
calculation that Gunn’s failure to file an internal IDOC complaint was an
unreasonable failure to avoid harm, the court failed to acknowledge Gunn’s
severe employment-related harms that were created and aggravated by another
plaintiff’s IDOC internal complaint of sexual harassment that identified Gunn as
a target of sexual harassment.352 As a result of the other plaintiff’s complaint,
IDOC subjected Gunn to scrutiny not suffered by other employees that resulted
in numerous disciplinary actions, including reprimands and suspensions.353
In sum, the Fields court failed to analyze and consider all harms and harm
avoidance actions in its liability determination. Although the court’s recognition
that avoidance of harm was the animating principle for employer liability is a
correct and important one, the court’s failure to analyze all of Gunn’s harm
avoidance actions taken to avoid all of the harms resulting from the sexual
harassment resulted in a liability determination that was not based on the true
avoidance of harm.
Accordingly, avoiding harm cannot always be satisfied by notice. In
addition, by focusing exclusively on whether an employee provided notice of the
sexual harassment to her employer, courts are failing to acknowledge and
analyze all of the harms resulting from sexual harassment and all of the strategies
an employee utilizes that are reasonably calculated to avoid these harms. The
result is that a liability determination is not being made based on a thorough
analysis of the harm avoidance principle.354

349. Id. at *3.
350. Id.
351. Id. at *4.
352. Fields, 2006 WL 2645200, at *4-7.
353. Id.
354. Theresa Beiner has provided another argument against a liability standard that requires
notice. Specifically, Beiner has argued that a liability standard that requires notice to the employer of
any sexual harassment would provide more protection to the employer, who is not a victim here, than
to the employee, who is the actual victim of sexual harassment. Beiner, Women’s Stories, supra note 6,
at 141-44. Moreover, it would provide absolutely no Title VII remedy to an employee who was in fact
sexually harassed and whose workplace was affected. Id. at 144. Beiner has stated that supervisor
sexual harassment should be considered a cost of business similar to a supervisor’s discriminatory
firing of an employee. Id. at 145. Accordingly, as no notice is required before liability could attach for
a discriminatory firing by a supervisor, no notice should be required before liability could attach for
supervisor sexual harassment.
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C. Avoiding Harm Should Be More Important than Conciliation as an
Animating Policy Behind the Affirmative Defense
Similarly, in evaluating an employee’s actions under the affirmative defense,
it is more appropriate to analyze whether those actions serve to avoid the
employee’s harms from sexual harassment than whether they promote informal
conciliation. It is true that in articulating the affirmative defense, along with the
importance of harm avoidance, the Supreme Court noted the importance of
Congress’s preference for conciliation rather than litigation of Title VII
violations.355 The Court reasoned that having a policy of nonharassment and a
mechanism by which an employee could complain would enable the employer to
resolve informally an employee’s sexual harassment claim.356 As a result, there
would be fewer charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC and less litigation
of such complaints in court.357 Despite the underlying rationale for the
affirmative defense, there are several reasons why conciliation is not necessarily
promoted by the liability framework and, therefore, whether an employee’s
actions are analyzed as promoting conciliation should not be the basis for
liability attachment.
First, as explained by Chamallas, effective conciliation is not achieved when
the conciliation decision makers are not neutral.358 The type of conciliation that
is promoted through the affirmative defense framework is one in which the
employer is both a party to the conciliation effort and the decision maker.359 This
structure is flawed because the decision makers are accountable to the employer
and, therefore, will tend to make decisions that are not based solely on the best
conciliation outcome for both parties.360 In addition, the employer’s conciliation
process, as discussed above, is not solely intended to reach an agreement without
litigation but also to protect the employer from legal liability.361 Further, a true
conciliation process at its core is intended to provide a speedy remedy to a
plaintiff.362 Yet employer conciliation mechanisms are often constructed to
355. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
356. Id.
357. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 145 (2004) (noting that linking employer’s
effective grievance procedures to liability promotes conciliation rather than litigation (citing Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 764)). In addition, the Court stated that the affirmative defense promoted conciliation in
another way. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998). Specifically, a liability
scheme that would find automatic liability for explicit and implicit uses of power by the supervisor
would encourage litigation rather than conciliation of all supervisor sexual harassment claims. Id. at
805. Accordingly, because the affirmative defense can preclude strict liability for the class of sexual
harassment claims that do not result in a tangible employment action without conciliation efforts, the
Court would be hindering litigation. Id.
358. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 379.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.; see also Marshall, supra note 178, at 86 (noting managers’ competing duties to shield
employer from liability and to redress employee grievances).
362. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1982) (analyzing lower court’s holding
on premise that conciliation is tool to get remedy to plaintiff quickly because litigation is so slow).
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ensure the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims by only minimally complying with the
employer-focused prong of the affirmative defense, thus ensuring that the
complaint mechanisms are not truly effective in getting the employees to
complain pursuant to them.363 It is precisely because of these flaws that
employer-run conciliation is not effective. In fact, under Title VII and previous
Supreme Court cases, the conciliation goal that is envisioned is one that would
occur through a neutral entity, such as the EEOC, not the employer.364
Therefore, under the affirmative defense, it does not make sense to prioritize
conciliation mechanisms that are operating solely to protect employers from
liability over harm avoidance mechanisms.
Second, as discussed earlier, notice should not be a required element of a
harm avoidance action to be credited to an employee.365 Yet, implicit in the
conciliation rationale is the notion that an employee subjected to sexual
harassment would need to provide notice to the employer and an opportunity to
resolve the complaint prior to any litigation. Conciliation may be a path to harm
avoidance, but it is not the only or most effective one.
Finally, it is important to note that despite the conciliation rationale, the
affirmative defense does not bar liability in all instances where conciliation with
the employer is not attempted. For instance, if the sexual harassment is one
severe act of sexual harassment, such as a supervisor raping an employee, then
the affirmative defense would not bar liability even though there was no
opportunity to provide notice by reporting that rape and conciliate the claim
before the sexual harassment had occurred.366 Accordingly, for the reasons
discussed above, conciliation cannot be the primary motivating rationale over
harm avoidance in deciding affirmative defense cases when it is merely a pretext

363. See Chamallas, supra note 13, at 379-80 (noting main goal of internal grievance procedures
is to shield employers from liability and that private enforcement procedures threaten Title VII by
failing to address reality adequately).
364. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 552 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(noting that EEOC executes Title VII’s procedures for conciliation).
365. See supra Part V.B for a discussion of the reasoning against an employer notice
requirement.
366. See Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that affirmative
defense, which was “adopted in cases that involved ongoing sexual harassment in a workplace, may
not protect an employer from automatic liability in cases of single, severe, unanticipatable sexual
harassment”); see also Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *4-5 (4th
Cir. 1999) (using affirmative defense and finding that employee who waited four months before
reporting that her supervisor raped her acted unreasonably according to second prong of affirmative
defense, and, moreover, employer satisfied first prong of defense as it did not fail to exercise
reasonable care by not anticipating supervisor was potential rapist); id. (noting that when employee
promptly complains of sexually harassing behavior and employer promptly responds, disciplines the
harasser, and stops the harassment, there will be no actionable behavior); Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 804 n.52 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (contending
that under Faragher and Ellerth, when supervisor engages in “sufficiently severe conduct,” e.g., rape,
employer may be vicariously liable regardless of timeliness of employer’s response or plaintiff’s
complaint); Marks, supra note 6, at 1423-28 (discussing fact that some courts have nonetheless held
that employer should be able to defeat liability by merely establishing employer-focused prong
without showing that employee complained pursuant to policy under employee-focused prong).
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for providing notice.
CONCLUSION
As seen in this Article, the concepts of employee harms and harm
avoidance are important to the liability framework for hostile work environment
sexual harassment by a supervisor. Whether an employer is liable for supervisor
sexual harassment depends in part on whether the employee avoids her harm or
mitigates her damages resulting from the sexual harassment. Despite the law’s
interest in employees’ harm avoidance, courts have failed to explore fully the
vast array of harms resulting from sexual harassment and the variety of ways in
which employees avoid these multiple harms.
This Article reframes the legal discussion of employees’ actions in response
to sexual harassment from one that almost exclusively focuses on whether the
employees failed to report the sexual harassment. As discussed above and shown
through the story of Lena, a limited view of the affirmative defense, one that
merely considers whether the employer had a policy and whether the employee
formally complained thereto, constructs women employees as nonactors because
they do not complain about being sexually harassed. They appear as “silent
sufferers.”367 And no liability attaches.
By resuscitating the “avoid harm otherwise” component of the affirmative
defense, through reliance on the avoidable consequences doctrine, Title VII
itself, and social science research, women employees’ fuller stories are able to be
told. They are stories of the employees as active persons, who engage internal
and external coping mechanisms in order to avoid discrimination as well as other
employment, economic, emotional, psychological, and physical harms. By doing
so, their more complete stories can be told and made available for
determinations pursuant to the liability framework for supervisor sexual
harassment.
As a result, the discourse of women’s subordination in the workplace can be
balanced with the embracing of women’s acts of resistance, choices, selfdefinition, and self-direction. By recognizing women’s agency we are creating the
necessary legal “space”368 between “construction”369 of oneself to
“determination”370 by oneself. Such a legal space is important for its potential to
impact women employees, their employers, and the larger legal discourse in the
courts and in scholarship regarding how women who are sexually harassed are

367. Chamallas, supra note 13, at 380 (stating that because of inherent flaws in internal grievance
procedures, employees may not come forward to complain and hence, as in 1970s, are silent sufferers);
see also Krieger, supra note 6, at 178-79 (observing that early social science research focused only on
externally focused coping mechanisms to sexual harassment and therefore internally focused strategies
were considered under the category of “‘ignoring’” or “‘doing nothing’” (citing David E. Terpstra &
Douglas D. Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 10 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 1, 5 (1989))).
368. Abrams, supra note 36, at 113.
369. Id.
370. Id.
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neither passive nor silent sufferers but rather complex actors. These employees
act in various ways to avoid the multiple forms of harm resulting from sexual
harassment.
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